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THE SUPREME COURT, THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
AND THE IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
OF STATE COURTS*
FROM PENNOYER TO DENCKLA: A REVIEW
P~uI B. KuAw--

When the ignorant are taught to doubt they do not know what they
safely may believe. And it seems to me at this time we need education in
the obvious more than investigation of the obscure.

IN

-HoLMES,

Collected Legal Papers 292-93 (1920)

MAiTTxRS of personal jurisdiction of state courts, no less than in matters
of the jurisdiction of the federal courts,' doctrines of federalism have
been subordinated by the Supreme Court to concepts of convenience. The
result is another major step-in this instance, perhaps a desirable one-toward
the limitation of the federal principle. For state lines may be as easily erased
by the enhancement of state power as by the expansion of national authority.
To the extent that one state's judicial control over a legal controversy is
increased, the control of all other states over that controversy is diminished.
That this creates serious problems for a federation was recognized early in
American constitutional history.
I. "WHAT'S PAST IS PROLOGUE"

In 1813, the Supreme Court of the United States was called upon to decide
whether a plea of nihil debet was a good defense in the United States Circuit
Court for the District of Columbia in a suit brought on a judgment secured
* This paper was prepared as a basis for discussion at a seminar to have been attended by
a committee of the Conference of Chief Justices and members of the faculty of the University of Chicago Law School.
+ Professor of Law, The Law School, The University of Chicago.
'See, e.g., Kurland, The Supreme Court and the Attrition of State Power, 10 Stanford L.
Rev. 274, 292-96 (1958).
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in a state court in New York.2 The New York judgment had been rendered in
a suit in which personal jurisdiction was obtained over the defendant by his
arrest within that state. The Supreme Court of the United States held that
since the judgment would have been enforced by another New York court, it
must also be enforced in the District of Columbia because of Congress' statute
implementing the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution.3 "If,"
said Mr. Justice Story for the Court, "it be a record, conclusive between the
parties, it cannot be denied but by the plea of nul tiel record; and when congress gave the effect of a record to the judgment, it gave all the collateral
consequences." 4 Mr. Justice Johnson dissented. He urged that nikil debet
was a proper plea in defense to a suit on a foreign judgment. He was led to
this dissent by reasons expressed in language which, as in the case of many
of his dissents, proved to be of greater appeal to his successors than to his
contemporaries. His position was not that the New York judgment was not
entitled to full faith and credit, but rather that a court which was asked to
enforce it had a right to determine whether the court rendering it had properly
attained jurisdiction. This could be done, he said, only if nikil debet were
available as a defense:
I am induced to vary, in deciding on this question, from an apprehension that
receiving the plea of nul tiel record may, at some future time, involve this court in
inextricable difficulty. In the case of Holker v. Parker,which we had before us this
term, we see an instance in which a judgment for $150,000 was given in Pennsylvania,
upon an attachment levied on a cask of wine; and debt brought on that judgment,
in the state of Massachusetts. Now, if, in this action, nul tiel record must necessarily
be pleaded, it would be difficult to find a method by which the enforcing of such a
judgment could be avoided. Instead of promoting, then, the object of the constitution,
by removing all causes for state jealousies, nothing could tend more to enforce them,
than enforcing such a judgment. There are certain eternal principles of justice, which
never ought to be dispensed with, and which courts of justice never can dispense
with, but when compelled by positive statute. One of these is, that jurisdiction cannot
be justly exercised by a state over property not within the reach of its process, or
over persons not owing them allegiance, or not subjected to their jurisdiction, by being
found within their limits. But if the states are at liberty to pass the most absurd laws
on this subject, and we admit of a course of pleading which puts it out of our power
to prevent the execution of judgments obtained under those laws, certainly, an effect
will be given that article of the constitution, in direct hostility with the object of it.5
By the time of Pennoyer v. Neff, 6 in which are to be found the origins of our
modern law of personal jurisdiction, Johnson's thesis had long been accepted
by the Court. The case arose on facts similar to those which had troubled
'Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch (U.S.) 481 (1813). See Morgan, Justice William Johnson
233-34 (1954); Jackson, Full Faith and Credit 11 (1945).
'The successor statute is now to be found in 62 Stat. 947, 28 U.S.C.A. S 1738 (1948).
' 7 Cranch (U.S.) 481, 484 (1813).
'Id., at 486.
6 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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Johnson. The question was the effect required to be given to an Oregon
judgment, pursuant to which a sheriff's sale purported to transfer title to the
defendant's land located in Oregon. In the first suit, the defendant had been
given notice only by publication in Oregon, in accordance with an Oregon
statute. He was domiciled elsewhere, presumably in California. The Supreme
Court held the Oregon judgment invalid. The opinion for the Court, written
by Mr. Justice Field, relied on Johnson's "eternal principles" to secure the
result and cited Story's Conflict of Laws to substantiate this conclusion. 7
No personal jurisdiction was acquired over the defendant:
... where the entire object of the action is to determine the personal rights and obligations of the defendants, that is, where the suit is merely in personam, constructive
service... upon a non-resident is ineffectual for any purpose. Process from the tribunals of one State cannot run into another State, and summon parties there domiciled
to leave its territory and respond to proceedings against them. Publication of process
or notice within the State where the tribunal sits cannot create any greater obligation
upon the non-resident to appear. Process sent to him out of the State, and process
published within it, are equally unavailing in proceedings to establish his personal
liability. 8
The presence of the property within the state did not authorize personal
jurisdiction; it could authorize exercise of jurisdiction over the property if
properly invoked:
... the State, through its tribunals, may subject property situated within its limits
owned by non-residents to the payment of the demand of its own citizens against
them; and the exercise of this jurisdiction in no respect infringes upon the sovereignty
of the State where the owners are domiciled. Every State owes protection to its own
citizens; and, when non-residents deal with them, it is a legitimate and just exercise
of authority to hold and appropriate any property owned by such non-residents to
satisfy the claims of its citizens. It is in virtue of the State's jurisdiction over the
property of the non-resident situated within its limits that its tribunals can inquire
into the non-resident's obligations to its own citizens, and the inquiry can then be
carried only to the extent necessary to control the disposition of the property. If the
non-resident has no property in the State, there is nothing upon which the tribunals
can adjudicate.9
But jurisdiction over the property in the Pennoyer case was Wanting because
of the failure of the plaintiff to levy on the property at the commencement of
the action. The jurisdiction of a court cannot attach where its validity will dlepend upon whether property of the defendant is discovered within the state
after the entry of the judgment."0
Once again a dissent seemed to demonstrate more prescience than the majority. Mr. Justice Hunt would have ruled:
Id., at 722-23.
8 Id., at 727.
Id., at 723-24. See Emanuel v. Symon, E1908] 1 K.B. 302 (CA.).
'o95 U.S. 714, 727-28 (1877).
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It belongs to the legislative power of the State to determine what shall be the
modes and means proper to be adopted to give notice to an absent defendant of the
commencement of a suit; and if they are such as are reasonably likely to communicate
to him information of the proceeding against him, and are in good faith designed to
give him such information, and an opportunity to defend is provided for him in the
event of his appearance in the suit, it is not competent to the judiciary to declare that
such proceeding is void as not being by due process of law. 1 '

Lest this language be considered more expansive than it really was, it should
be noted that Hunt was talking only of suits against defendants owning property
within the state, i.e., actions in rem, or quasi in rem. He was not then suggesting
that a state legislature could create nationwide in personam jurisdicion for its
courts. It fell to later decisions to suggest such extensions of his principles. 12
The importance of Pennoyer v. Neff, however, rests not on its holding, which
denied full faith and credit to the Oregon judgment,'3 but rather on its dicta
whiich read Johnson's "eternal principles" into the Due Process Clause, a provision of the Constitution not applicable to the case then before the Court:
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amenmnt... the validity of such judgments
may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted on the ground
that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations
of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of
law ....
To give such proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent
by its constitution--that is, by the law of its creation-to pass upon the subjectmatter of the suit; and, if that involves merely a determination of the personal liability
of the defendant, he must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of process
within the State, or his voluntary appearance.
Except in cases affecting the personal status of the plaintiff, and cases in which that
mode of service may be considered to have been assented to in advance... substituted
service.., where actions are brought against non-residents, is effectual only where,in connection with process against the person for commencing the action, property
in the State is brought under the control of the court, and subjected to its disposition
by process adapted to that purpose, or where the judgment is sought as a means of
reaching such property or affecting some interest therein; in other words, where the
4
action is in the nature of a proceeding in rem.
Field went further in giving content to the Due Process Clause in this area:
To prevent any misapplication of the views expressed in this opinion, it is proper
to observe that we do not mean to assert, by any thing we have said, that a State may
not authorize proceedings to determine the status of one of its citizens towards a nonresident, which would be binding within the State, though made without service of
process or personal notice to the non-resident....
"Id., at 737.
Cf. Mr. Justice Traynor's opinion for the court in Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49
Cal.2d 339, 316 P.2d 960 (1958).
"95 U.S. 714, 732-33 (1877).

"Id., at 733.
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Neither do we mean to assert that a State may not require a non-resident entering
into a partnership or association within its limits, or making contracts enforceable
there, to appoint an agent or representative in the State to receive service of process
and notice in legal proceedings instituted with respect to such partnership, association,
or contracts, or to designate a place where such service may be made and notice
given, and provide, upon their failure, to make such appointment or to designate such
place that service may be made upon a public officer designated for that purpose, or
in some other prescribed way, and that judgments rendered upon such service may
not be binding upon the non-residents both within and without the State. . . Nor
do we doubt that a State on creating corporations or other institutions for pecuniary
or charitable purposes, may provide a mode in which their conduct may be investigated, their obligations enforced, or their charters revoked, which shall require other
than personal service on their officers or members. 15
Pennoyer v. Neff thus established the principle that a judgment is entitled to
full faith and credit only if it satisfies the requirements of the Due Process
Clause, for if it does not meet those requirements it is not properly enforceable
even within the State which rendered it. In a fashion not uncommon to the
Supreme Court of the United States, it thus purported to decide many questions
which were not before it.
Between Pennoyer v. Neff and International Shoe Co. v. Washington,'6 the
courts, both state and national, were occupied in filling the interstices of the
doctrines announced by Field and in stretching the concepts of consent and
presence to authorize jurisdiction where consent in fact did not, and presence
could not, exist. The rapid development of transportation and communication
in this country demanded a revision of Johnson's "eternal principles" incorporated by Field in the Due Process Clause: "eternal principles" which were
appropriate for the age of the "horse and buggy" or even for the age of the
"iron horse" could not serve the era of the airplane, the radio, and the tele7
phone.'
It was characteristic of our legal institutions, however, that the first approaches
to a solution of the problem, both in the legislatures and in the courts, were made
not interms of a bold adjustment of legal concepts to a novel social problem, but
in terms that purported to fit the new provisions into the established framework of
jurisdictional concepts.' 8
By 1945, even the Supreme Court of the United States recognized the necessity
9
for the substitution of appropriate doctrine for the "fictive"' rules which had
developed under the aegis of Pennoyer v. Neff. To help to understand the
- 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
- Id., at 734-35.
' Cf. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957); Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251, 260 (1958).
,Mr. Justice Schaefer, in Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 386, 143 N.E.2d 673, 677 (1957).
Olberding v. Illinois Central R.R., 346 US. 338, 340-41 (1953).
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changes in doctrine, if not necessarily in result, which have followed the International Shoe case, it is proposed to state briefly the guiding rules existent at
the time that decision was rendered. If these rules may be stated fairly succinctly, it should be noted that they were not to be applied with equal ease.
A. PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER INDIVIDUALS
2l
20
As indicated in Johnson's opinion in Mills v. Duryee, service of process
on an individual within a state is sufficient to create personal jurisdiction over
him, although the state may eschew such power if the defendant's presence was
procured by the fraud or force of the plaintiff,2 or if the defendant is afforded
a status which immunizes him from service of process.23 The derivation of the
rule was succinctly stated by Mr. Justice Holmes: "The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power .... -24 This rule does not exist in civil law2 and has
been the object of cogent criticism,26 inasmuch as it affords a basis for jurisdiction over defendants whose relationship to the state may be accidental and
fleeting and regardless of the place of origin of the claim asserted. But if any
change is to take place in this rule it is more likely to be through the avenue of
forum non conveniens than the Due Process Clause, although the "new doctrine"
of appropriate connection with the state of the forum could well be developed
27
to limit as well as expand state judicial power.

See discussion at 569-70 supra. Cf. Schibsby v. Westenholz, L.R. 6 Q.B. 155 (1870).
This article will not be concerned with the appropriate method of service; it is assumed
herein that the method of service "most likely to reach the defendant," McDonald v. Mabee,
243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917), must be utilized to secure jurisdiction. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Walker v. Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
-See Commercial Mutual Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S. 245, 256 (1909) ; Blandin v.
Ostrander, 239 Fed. 700 (C.A.2d, 1917) ; Jurisdiction over Persons Brought into a State by
Force or Fraud, 39 Yale L. J. 889 (1930) ; cf. Jaster v. Currie, 198 U.S. 144 (1905).
'See Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222 (1932); Page Co. v. MacDonald, 261 U.S. 446
(1923); Stewart v. Ramsey, 242 U.S. 128 (1916); Ray, Privilege of Nonresident Attorney
from Service of Civil Process, 17 Ky. L. J. 197 (1922); Keeffe and Roscia, Immunity and
Sentimentality, 32 Cornell L. Q. 471 (1947); Immunity of Non-resident Participants in a
Judicial Proceeding from Service of Process, 26 Ind. L. J. 459 (1951).
'McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) ; cf. Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S.
346 (1913).
'See Beale, Jurisdiction of Courts over Foreigners, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 283 (1912,
1913).
'See Dodd, Jurisdiction in Personal Actions, 23 11. L. Rev. 427 (1929); iRheinstein,
Michigan Legal Studies: A Review, 41 Mich. L. Rev. 83, 91 (1942) ; Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 Yale
L. J. 289 (1956). Professors Rheinstein and Dodd attack the reasonableness of the rule. Professor Ehrenzweig's rejection of the historical basis for the rule in this country neglects the
fact that the American states have often regarded each other as foreign sovereignties. See,
e.g., Detroit v. Proctor, 44 Del. 193, 202, 61 A.2d 412, 416 (1948): "Michigan's sovereignty is
as foreign to Delaware as Russia's."
See opinion of Black, J., in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 322
(1Q45).
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What Johnson spoke of as "allegiance" 28 has also been used for the assertion
of personal jurisdiction. Domicile has served state courts as a constitutional
base for asserting jurisdiction over absent defendants, 29 just as nationality has
30
been the ground for the assertion of authority by federal courts over absentees.
The rationalizations expressed by the courts would not seem to limit this power
to cases having a reasonable connection with the forum state, since the state of
domicile or citizenship may well provide the only forum in which an elusive
defendant may be sued.
Personal jurisdiction may also be exercised over defendants who voluntarily
submit to the jurisdiction of the court, regardless of the absence of other
connection between the litigation and the forum. Actual consent creates comparatively little difficulty; 31 the primary source of problems arises in those cases
in which the thesis of consent has been extended to cover cases where in fact
32

consent does not exist.

Actual consent may be given in advance of litigation by an agreement which
calls for the submission of any dispute arising out of the transactions specified
in the agreement, either to a named tribunal or to such tribunal as the future
plaintiff may choose.
The mere appearance of a defendant in a law suit for a purpose other than
to attack the jurisdiction of the court over him is considered a voluntary submission to the court's power.3 3 Indeed, even a special appearance to contest
personal jurisdiction may be validly treated as a submission to the court.34 And
a plaintiff may be assumed to have agreed to the court's jurisdiction over him
not only for the purpose of the claims which he asserts but with reference to
claims asserted against him by defendants to the action.35
2 See text at note 5 supra.
'See Milhiken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) ; cf. United States v. Bowman, 260
U.S. 94 (1922) ; Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924) ; Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941)
(state court jurisdiction) ; Citizenship as a Ground for Personal jurisdiction, 27 Harv. L.
Rev. 464 (1914).
' Even actual consent has created some problems, as in the case of cognovit notes and
consent to jurisdiction of a foreign tribunal. See, e.g., Gavit, The Indiana Cognovit Note
Statute, 5 Ind. L. J. 208 (1929) ; Commercial Arbitration and the Conflict of Laws, 56
Col. L. Rev. 902 (1956); Grauper, Contractual Stipulations Conferring Exclusive Jurisdiction upon Foreign Courts in the Law of England and Scotland, 59 L. Q. Rev. 227 (1943).
"See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 735 (1877) ; Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure 4041 (1922).

'See Western Loan & Savings Co. v. Butte & Boston Min. Co, 210 U.S. 368 (1908);
Houston v. Ormes, 252 U.S. 469 (1920); d. Toledo Ry. and Light Co. v. Hill, 244 U.S. 49
(1917) ; Cain v. Commercial Pub. Co, 232 U.S. 124 (1914).
' See York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890) ; Kauffman v. Wootters, 138 U.S. 285 (1891);
Western Indemnity Co. v. Rupp, 235 U.S. 261 (1914); Harris v. Taylor, [1915] 2 K.B. 580

(C.A.).
' See Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938).
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The cases dealing with the nonresident motorist statutes have provided a
bridge between the consent cases and the cases in which jurisdiction over the
person is predicated on the fact that the defendant has engaged in certain
activity within the state.3 6 From the doubtful premise that a state may refuse
the use of its highways to nonresident individuals,3 7 it was thought to follow that
a state might condition the use of the highways on receipt of consent to be sued
in the state courts"for any action arising out of the use of the highways.3 8 From
the right to demand actual consent, the states were held to be free to imply
"consent" by any user so long as service was made within the state.39 But
"[u]nder the statute," the Supreme Court said, "the implied consent is limited
to proceedings growing out of accidents or collisions on a highway in which the
non-resident may be involved." 40 Thirty years later the Court recognized what
had long been apparent to others, that "to conclude from this holding that the
motorist, who never consented to anything and whose consent is altogether immaterial, has actually agreed to be sued ... is surely to move in the world of
Alice in Wonderland." 4'
A more realistic rationalization of the validity of the nonresident motorists
statutes might well have provided a basis for jurisdiction over individuals
engaged in activities within the state other than driving automobiles. In 1919,42
Professor Austin W. Scott wrote a most persuasive article in support of the
thesis "that a state might constitutionally provide that the doing of business
within the state by a nonresident should subject him to the jurisdiction of the
courts of the state as to causes of action arisingout of such business; and that
a nonresident by doing business within a state which had made such a provision
subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state as to such causes
of action."143 In 1926, he concluded another article with the following language:
It would seem that a state may subject a nonresident doing acts within the state,
involving danger to life or property, to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state as
to causes of action arisingout of those acts. In particular, it would seem that a state
may subject a nonresident operating an automobile within the state to the jurisdiction
'

See Carey, A Suggested Fundamental Basis of Jurisdiction with Special Emphasis on
Judicial Proceedings Affecting Decedents' Estates, 24 Ill. L. Rev. 170, 177 et seq. (1929).
' See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
3'

Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916):
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.. 352 (1927).
'Id., at 356; see Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresident Motorists, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 563
(1926); Scott, Hess and Pawloski Carry On, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 98 (1950).
Olberding v. Illinois Central R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 341 (1953).
Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresidents Doing Business within a State, 32 Harv. L. Rev.

871 (1919).
' Scott, Jurisdiction over Non-resident Motorists, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 563 (1926)
phasis added).
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of the courts of the state as to causes of action arising out of the operation of the
automobile."
The latter concept was more palatable to the Court. Even while talking about
implied consent in Hess v. Pawloski, the Court emphasized the fact that "[m]otor vehicles are dangerous machines ... their use is attended by serious dangers
to persons and property.1 45 At the same time, however, the Court was careful to
state that the "mere transaction of business in a State by non-resident natural
persons does not imply consent to be bound by the process of its courts."4 6 And
without "consent" no jurisdiction would attach 47 because "a State may not
withhold from nonresident individuals the right of doing business therein.1 48
By 1935, however, the Court was beginning to accept the notion that doing business within a state was sufficient basis for jurisdiction over a nonresident
individual, at least where "the business" done could be validly treated by the
state as "exceptional" and, therefore, subject to regulation, and service could
be made within the state on an agent appointed to carry out that business. 49
B. IN PERSONAM

JURISDICTION OVER CORPORATIONS

A domestic corporation is subject to suit in the courts of the state of its
incorporation, whether because it is a creature of that state and therefore necessarily subject to its control, or because it is "domiciled" there, or because it is
"cpresent" there.50
Foreign corporations have proved more difficult to fit into the concepts which
underlie the principles of personal jurisdiction relating to individuals, for it
has been thought necessary to speak in "fictive" terms whether the term used
is the corporation's "citizenship,"' its "domicile," its "consent," or its "presence." "Until toward the middle of the [nineteenth] century, the idea seems to
have been widely prevalent that foreign attachment was the only process
available against them.1 52 In some measure the difficulties flowed from a notion phrased by Mr. Chief Justice Taney in Bank of Augusta v. Earle:
"Id., at 586 (emphasis added).
-274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927).
- 274 U.S. 352, 355 (1927).

"Id., at 355.
"See Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919).

"Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935). It should be noted that the Court distinguished the Flexner case on a tenuous ground suggested by Professor Scott. See Scott,
Fundamentals of Procedure, 68-69 (1922) ; see also Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d. 378, 388-89,
143 N.E.2d 673, 678-79 (1957).
See quotation from Pennoyer v. Neff in text at note 15 supra; Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws 209 (3d ed., 1949) ; Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure 47 (1922).
" See, for another aspect of the problems of the fiction of corporate "citizenship,"
McGovney, A Supreme Court Fiction, Corporations in the Diverse Citizenship Jurisdiction
of the Federal Courts, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 1090, 1225 (1943).
'Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in Americani Constitutional Law 77

(1918).
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...a corporation can have no legal existence out of the bundaries of the sovereignty
by which it is created. It exists only in contemplation of law, and by force of the law;
and where that law ceases to operate, and is no longer obligatory, the corporation can
have no existence. It must dwell in the place of its creation; and cannot migrate to
53
another sovereignty.
This apparently did not mean that a corporation was precluded from engaging
in activities beyond the borders of the state of its incorporation, but only that
any activity which it conducted outside the state of its incorporation was
dependent upon the permission of the government within whose jurisdiction
it desired to operate. Strange conclusions, in terms of in personam jurisdiction,
necessarily flowed from this strange principle.
As the corporate form of business became more and more the common method
of carrying on economic activity, it became incumbent on the courts to make
provision for suits by and against such entities in foreign states. Two major
theories evolved and merged into a third, none of which proved satisfactory.
The first was the "consent" theory, which quickly prevailed in the Supreme
Court. The second was a theory of "presence," which became necessary in order
to fill the gaps which the "consent" theory did not cover, but which required
the rejection of the Taney dictum in Bank of Augusta v.Earle. The third was
the "doing business" notion.
1. "Consent."-The consent thesis rested on the proposition that, since a
foreign corporation could not carry on business within a state without the permission of that state, the state could impose as a condition of engaging in business within its borders a requirement that the corporation appoint an agent to
receive service of process within the state. Thus, in Lafayette Insurance Co. v.
French,"4 Mr. Justice Curtis, speaking for all but one member of the Court, said:
A corporation created by Indiana can transact business in Ohio only with the consent, express or implied, of the latter state. 13 Pet. 519. This consent may be accompanied by such conditions as Ohio may think fit to impose; and these conditions must
be deemed valid and effectual by other States, and by this court, provided they are
not repugnant to the constitution or laws of the United States, or inconsistent with
those rules of public law which secure the jurisdiction and authority of each State
from encroachment by all others, or that principle of natural justice which forbids
condemnation without opportunity for defence. 55
The limitations of "public law" and "natural justice" were necessarily vague,
and were ultimately to be merged into the Due Process Clause when the Fourteenth Amendment became effective. 56 No really difficult problem was presented
by the Lafayette Insurance case, for there suit was in Ohio on an insurance
policy issued by a resident agent in Ohio on Ohio property with service of
13 Pet. (U.S.) 519, 588 (1839).
18 How. (U.S.) 404 (1855).
'

m

Id, at 407.

See Riverside Mills v. Menefee, 237 US. 189 (1915).
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process made on the agent in accord with the terms of an Ohio statute which
authorized suits on insurance policies in the county in which "the contract may
be made." The important limitations on the conditions which could be imposed
by the state were set forth later by Mr. Justice Field in St. Clair v. Cox:
The State may, therefore, impose as a condition upon which a foreign corporation
shall be permitted to do business within her limits, that it shall stipulate that in any
litigation arising out of its transactionsin the State, it will accept as sufficient the
service of process on its agents or persons specially designated; and the condition
would be eminently fit and just. And such condition and stipulation may be implied as
57
well as expressed.
Field reiterated the primary limitation that "the corporation be engaged in
business in the State, and the agent be appointed to act there."5S8 The Court
later made it clear, too, that the agent must be one who would be likely to
inform the corporation of the receipt and content of the process and if service
were made on an official or person designated by the state that such person be
required to forward notice of the suit to the defendant. 59 The "consent" which
a state could demand was held to be a valid base for jurisdiction of the federal
courts within that state as well as of state courts.60
One of the questions resulting from the adoption of this thesis was whether,
if implied consent was confined to cases arising out of transactions within the
state as stated in St. Clairv. Cox, the consent secured by the actual appointment
of an agent by the corporation was similarly limited. Three of America's greatest
jurists answered the question in the negative. Lengthy quotation from an early
opinion of judge Learned Hand in Smolik v. Philadelphiaand Reading Co.6'
will state both the problem and the solution which became the law; it also
suggested a doctrine which reappeared in the InternationalShoe case:
The defendant here argues that the terms of such an implied consent cannot be
supposed to be other than that which the state statute attempts to exact, and that
if the implied consent is to be limited, as has now been indubitably done, the express
consent must be limited in exactly the same way. Were this not true, the defendant
urges, an outlaw who refused to obey the laws of the state would be in better position
than a corporation which chooses to conform. The theory of implied consent dialectically requires the same limitations to be imposed upon express consents, at least in
the absence of some explicit language to the contrary in the state statute.
The plaintiffs, on the other hand, urge that the express consent of a foreign corporation to the service of process upon its agent ... must be interpreted in the light of
- Id., at 357.
106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882) (emphasis added).
Commercial Mutual Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S. 245, 255 (1909) ; cf. Wuchter v.
Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
' Railroad Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. (U.S.) 65 (1840) ; Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369
(1877).
- 222 Fed. 148 (S.D.N.Y., 1915).
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the statutes of the state, giving jurisdiction to its own courts, and that in the cases at
bar residents of New York may... sue foreign corporations on any cause of action
whatever. While, of course, the jurisdiction of this court over the subject-matter of
suits depends altogether upon federal statutes, the question now is of personal jurisdiction, and that depends upon the interpretation of the consent actually given, an
interpretation determined altogether by the intent of the state statutes. That intent
being determined, there is no constitutional objection to a state's exacting a consent
from foreign corporations to any jurisdiction which it may please, as a condition of
doing business. Intent and power uniting in the sections in question, how is it possible
to confine the provision to actions arising from business done within the state?
These two arguments, treated as mere bits of dialectic, lead to opposite results,
each by unquestionable deduction, so far as I can see. One must be vicious and the
vice arises I think from confounding a legal fiction with a statement of fact. When it
is said that a foreign corporation will be taken to have consented to the appointment
of an agent to accept service, the court does not mean that as a fact it has consented
at all, because the corporation does not in fact consent; but the court, for purposes
of justice, treats it as if it had. It is true that the consequences so imputed to it lie
within its own control, since it need not do business within the state, but that is not
equivalent to a consent; actually it might have refused to appoint, and yet its refusal
would make no difference. The court, in the interests of justice, imputes results to
the voluntary act of doing business within the foreign state, quite independently of
62
any intent.
Judge Cardozo, as he then was, reached the same conclusion, saying that
"[tihe distinction is between a true consent and an imputed or implied consent,
between a fact and a fiction." 63 And Mr. Justice Holmes spoke for the Supreme
Court in arriving at the same destination. 64 One may wonder how, in rejecting
the fiction of consent for the corporations which have not appointed agents,
these three could have found "a true consent" in the appointment of an agent
in conformity with statutes, especially when the statutes have not suggested
different treatment for extorted actual consent and the equally unwilling implied
consent. Holmes said only that:
...when a power actually is conferred by a document, the party executing it takes
the risk of the interpretation that may be put upon it by the courts. The execution
was the defendant's voluntary act.6 5
One may wonder, too, why, if it is the Due Process Clause--or a "principle of
natural justice"-which denied the power of the state to imply consent to suit
on claims arising out of transactions occurring elsewhere than within the state,
it did not also deny to the state the power to extort such a consent in writing.
-1d., at 150-51.

'Bagdon v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 217 N.Y. 432, 437, ill N.E. 1075,
1076 (1916).

" Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining &Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917).
-Id., at 96.
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Certainly the St. Clair case on which these cases are predicated drew no such
distinction.
There was still another major difficulty with the consent thesis. The Privileges
and Immunities Clause did not prohibit a state from excluding a foreign cor6
poration. This point was made pellucidly in Paul v. Virginia"
in language quite
reminiscent of Taney's in Bank of Augusta v. Earle:
The corporation being the mere creation of local law, can have no legal existence
beyond the limits of the sovereignty where created .... Having no absolute right of

recognition in other states, but depending for such recognition and the enforcement
of its contracts upon their assent, it follows, as a matter of course, that such assent
may be granted upon such terms and conditions as those States may think proper to
impose. They may exclude the foreign corporation entirely; they may restrict its
business to particular localities, or they may exact such security for the performance
of its contracts with their citizens as in their judgment will best promote the public
67
interest. The whole matter rests in their discretion.
But insurance, which was the subject of the business involved in that case, was
not then considered "interstate commerce."69 And it soon became established
law that a foreign corporation could not be prevented by a state from carrying
on interstate commerce within its borders.6 9 It would seem to follow that if
the state's power to exact consent to be sued depended on its power to exclude.
and it could not exclude, it could not exact such consent. 0 Nonetheless, the
Court continued to hold that foreign corporations were subject to the jurisdiction of state courts, even if the business they carried on within the state was
interstate commerce.

71

The major defects in the consent thesis were obvious. The failure of its conceptualism was recognized long before the Supeme Court took official notice
of it. In 1855, for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court described the notion.
in terms equally applicable to the "presence" notion, which should have proved
hard to refute:
If a corporation may sue within a foreign jurisdiction, it would seem consistent

with sound principle that it should also be liable to be sued within such jurisdiction.
Id., at 181.
8 Wall. (U.S.) 168 (1868).
Id., at 183. See Powell, Insurance as Commerce in Constitution and Statute, 57 Harv. L.
Rev. 937 (1944).
Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1877) ; International Text Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910); cd. Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. (U.S.)

123 (1868).
, By 1922, the Supreme Court had made it quite clear that there were many limitations
on a state's power to exclude foreign corporations unless they complied with state limitations. See, e.g., Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922) ; Fidelity & Deposit
Co. v. Tafoya, 270 U.S. 426 (1926), Frankfurter, J., concurring in Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 74 (1954).
' International HarvesterCo. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914) ; International Text Book
Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910).
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The difficulty is this, that process against a corporation must, at common law, be served
upon the principal officer of the corporation within the jurisdiction of that sovereignty
by which it was created. The rule is founded upon the principle, that the artificial,
invisible, and intangible corporate body is exclusively the creature of the law; that
it has no existence, except by operation of law, and that, consequently, it has no
existence without the limits of that sovereignty, and beyond the operation of those
laws by which it was created, and by whose power it exists. The rule rests upon a
highly artificial reason, and, however technically just, is confined at this day in its
application within exceedingly narrow limits. A corporation may own property, may
transact business, may contract debts; it may bring suits, it may use its common
seal; nay, it may be sued within a foreign jurisdiction, provided a voluntary appearance is entered to the action. It has then existence, vitality, efficiency, beyond the
jurisdiction of the sovereignty which created it, provided it be voluntarily exercised.
If it be said that all these acts are performed by its agents, as they may be in the
case of a private individual, and that the corporation itself is not present, the answer
is, that a corporation acts nowhere, except by its officers and agents. It has no tangible
existence, except through its officers. For all practical purposes, its existence is as
real, as vital, and efficient elsewhere as within the jurisdiction that created it. It may
perform every act without the jurisdiction of the sovereignty that created it that it
may within it. Its existence anywhere and everywhere is but ideal. It has no actual
personal identity and existence as a natural person has, no body which may exist
in one place and be served with process while its agents and officers are in another.
Process can only be served upon the officers of a corporation within its own juris2
diction, not upon the corporation itself3
Nonetheless, the consent theory continued to dominate the opinions of the
Supreme Court. As late as 1933, the Court was still speaking the pure language
of Bank of Augusta v. Earle and St. Clair v. Cox.7 3
2. "Presence."-- The presence doctrine afforded an equally defective pattern, for it necessarily rejected the theme of Bank of Augusta and Paul v.
Virginia, that a corporation cannot exist beyond the limits of the state which
created it. From time to time, however, the Supreme Court spoke as though the
issue were one of presence rather than consent.7 4 Thus, Mr. Justice Brandeis
said in Philadelphia and Reading R.R. v. McKibbin,75 "A foreign corporation
is amenable to process to enforce a personal liability, in the absence of consent,
only if it is doing business within the State in such manner and to such extent
" Moulin v. Trenton Mutual Life and Fire Insurance Co., 25 N.J.L. 57, 60-61 (1855).
"Washington ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker, Inc. v. Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361,
364 (1933).
' See New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Woodworth, 111 U.S. 138 (1884); Barrow
Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 US. 100 (1898); Philadelphia & Reading R.R. v. McKibbin,
243 U.S. 264 (1917) ; Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923) ; Bank
of America v. Whitney Central National Bank, 261 U.S. 171 (1923). See Cahill, Jurisdiction
over Foreign Corporations and Individuals Who Carry on Business Within the Territory,
30 Harv. L. Rev. 676 (1917).
- 243 U.S. 264 (1917).
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as to warrant the inference that it is present there."' 76 And very distinguished
authorities in other courts adopted this approach to the problemY77 The presence
theory, unlike the consent doctrine, would sustain jurisdiction against corporations on claims which did not arise out of the business done within the state, 78
a position which the Supreme Court never openly espoused. On the other hand,
under that doctrine, the departure from the state by the corporation by ceasing
to do business therein would preclude later assertion of jurisdiction even as to
claims which grew out of the business it had once done there.79 The implied
consent theory would sustain jurisdiction under such circumstances.8 0
In the same fashion in which he had removed the mask of the consent
theory,81 Judge Hand exposed the false face of the presence thesis. In Hutchinson v. Chase and Gilbert,8 2 he wrote for a court made up of three of the most
capable judges ever to sit on any American bench:
It scarcely advances the argument to say that a corporation must be 'present' in
the foreign state, ifwe define that word as demanding such dealings as will subject
itto jurisdiction, for then itdoes no more than put the question to be answered.
Indeed, itis doubtful whether ithelps much inany event. It isdifficult, to us itseems
impossible, to impute the idea of locality to a corporation, except by virtue of those
acts which realize its purposes. The shareholders, officers and agents are not individually the corporation, and do not carry itwith them inall their legal transactions. It
is only when engaged upon its affairs that they can be said to represent it, and we
can see no qualitative distinction between one part of its doings and another, so they
carry out the common plan. If we are to attribute locality to it at all, it must be equally
present wherever any part of its work goes on, as much in the little as in the great.
When we say therefore, that a corporation may be sued only where it is 'present,'
we understand that the word is used, not literally, but as shorthand for something
else. It might indeed be argued that it must stand suit upon any controversy arising
out of legal transactions entered into where the suit was brought, but that would
impose upon it too severe a burden. On the other hand, it is not plain that it ought
not, upon proper notice, to defend suits arising out of foreign transactions, if it conducts a continuous business in the state of the forum. At least the Court of Appeals of
New York seems still to suppose this to be true.... But a single transaction is certainly not enough, whether a substantial business subjects that corporation to jurisdiction generally, or only as to local transactions. There must be some continuous
dealings inthe state of the forum; enough to demand trial away from its home.
This last appears to us to be really the controlling consideration, ex.pressed shortly
-8Id., at 265.

See, e.g., Judge Cardozo's opinion inTauza v.Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259,
115 N.E. 915 (1917), which secured a wide following inother states.
Ibid.
Chipman v.Thomas B.Jeffrey Co., 251 U.S. 373 (1920).

8 Washington ex rel. Bond & Goodwin &Tucker, Inc. v.Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361
(1933).
1 See discussion at 579-80 supra.

'

45 F.2d 139 (C.A.2d, 1930).
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by the word 'presence,' but involving an estimate of the inconveniences which would
result from requiring it to defend, where it has been sued. We are to inquire whether
the extent and continuity of what it has done in the state in question makes it reasonable to bring it before one of its courts. Nor is it anomalous to make the question
of jurisdiction depend upon a practical test.... This does not indeed avoid the
uncertainties, for it is as hard to judge what dealings make it just to subject a foreign
corporation to local suit, as to say when it is 'present,' but at least it puts the real
question, and that is something. In its solution we can do no more than follow the
decided cases.8s
In his conclusion, Judge Hand once again foreshadowed the doctrine which the
Supreme Court would later adopt:
In the end there is nothing more to be said than that all the defendant's local activities, taken together, do not make it reasonable to impose such a burden upon it. It
is fairer that the plaintiffs should go to Boston than that the defendant should come
here. Certainly such a standard is no less vague than any that the courts have hitherto
set up; one may look from one end of the decisions to the other and find no vade
84
mecum.
3. "Doing Business."--The courts thus came round to using either the consent thesis or the presence thesis, depending largely upon which would support
jurisdiction over the nonresident corporation. No notice was taken of the underlying inconsistency between the two doctrines. The application of either created
difficulties, for whichever was chosen it became necessary to determine whether
the foreign corporation was "doing business' within the state, either to decide
whether its "consent"' could properly be "implied," or to discover whether the
corporation was "present." The law reports became cluttered with decisions as
to what constituted "doing business." The cases drew fine lines which made little
sense in terms of either theory. A fair sampling is afforded by Judge Learned
Hand in Hutchinson v. Chase and Gilbert:
Possibly the maintenance of a regular agency for the solicitation of business will
serve without more. The [negative] answer made in Green v. C.B. and Q.R.R. Co.,
205 U.S. 530 ... and People's Tob. Co. v. Amer. Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 ...
perhaps becomes somewhat doubtful in the light of International Harvester Co. v.
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 ... and, if it still remains true, it readily yields to slight
additions. In Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co ...there was no more, but the business
was continuous and substantial. Purchases, though carried on regularly, are not enough
(Rosenberg Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516.. .), nor are the activities of subsidiary corporations (Peterson v. Chicago, R.I. and P. Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 364...;
Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 ...), or of connecting carriers
(Philadelphia and Read. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264...). The maintenance of an
office, though always a make-weight, and enough when accompanied by continuous
negotiation, to settle claims (St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 ... ), is
not of much significance (Davega, Inc. v. Lincoln Furniture Co., 29 F. (2d) (C.C.A.2).
83Id., atl141.

" Id., at 142.
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It is quite impossible to establish any rule from the decided cases, we must step from
tuft to tuft and across the morass.85

The myriad of cases dealing with the question of "doing business" soon substituted that shibboleth for any theory. Without looking back of the words,
the courts held that jurisdiction existed if the corporate defendant was "doing
business" within the jurisdiction but no jurisdiction existed if it were not "doing
business." 6 Even when so broadly defined as in the Restatement of the Conflict
of Laws, 87 this concept provided no basis for growth since it offered a conclusion rather than a reason. The only reasons were those implicit in the doctrines
of "consent" or "presence" and these were obviously unsatisfactory.
The real difficulty underlying these attempts to work out a rationale for
personal jurisdiction lay in the fact that the doctrines were borrowed from
laws relating to wholly independent sovereignties which were not relevant to
jurisdictions joined in a federation.88 The basic premise for such decisions was
"that a judgment... is necessarily something to be enforced and that a state
which is physically impotent to enforce its judgments should be treated as
legally incompetent to adjudicate. .

. ."89

But with the Full Faith and Credit

Clause as an overriding principle, such a premise only puts the question; it does
not answer it.90 The real question becomes not whether a state could itself enforce a judgment, but rather under what circumstances the national power
should be used to assist the extraterritorial enforcement of a state's judicial decrees. 91 The great importance of Pennoyer v. Neff is that it identified the test
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause with the test under the Due Process
Clause, making a judgment which would not be enforceable beyond the borders
of the state unenforceable within its boundaries. If there are reasons, concerned
with the state's relationship with the litigation, why a judgment is not entitled
to extrastate enforcement, those reasons should be sufficient to sustain attack
within the state. Although Pennoyer suggested this principle, there remained
the necessity for fixing criteria for determining when the absence of the state's
physical power would be supplemented by the command of the national soverId., at 141-42.
See Rothschild, Jurisdiction of Foreign Corporations in Personam, 17 Va. L. Rev. 129
(1930).
v,§167, Comment a (1934): "Doing business is doing a series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit, or otherwise accomplishing an object, or doing
a single act for such purpose with the intention of thereby initiating a series of such acts."
See also Rest., Judgments §30, comment b (1942).
See Sobeloff, Jurisdiction of State Courts over Non-Residents in our Federal System,
43 Cornell L. Q. 196 (1958), who would continue the pre-federal notions.
Dodd, op. cit. supra note 26, at 429.
Cf. Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 620,
622 (1954).

" See id., at 666-67.
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eign, criteria which must necessarily change with the basic changes in our
methods of carrying on economic activity and with the changes in means of
transportation and communication. The attempts to adapt old language to
new problems proved unhappy in their result.
With doctrine in so bad a state of disrepair,92 the time had long since passed
for the Supreme Court to acknowledge the truth of Holmes' dictum that "[t]he
Constitution is not to be satisfied with a fiction."93 InternationalShoe Co. v.
Washington9" afforded the Court an opportunity to begin to set its house in
order in this field.
II. InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington
The InternationalShoe case, like Erie R.R. v.Tompkins,9 5 served rather
to destroy existent doctrine than to establish new criteria for the Supreme
Court and other courts to follow. Unlike Erie, however, it did not purport to
overrule the multitude of cases which rested on the earlier doctrinal errors. It
is noteworthy primarily for its belated recognition of the fictive nature of the
principles of "implied consent" and "presence" and not for the discovery of that
"vade mecum" which Judge Learned Hand had found so elusive.9 6
The facts, as Mr. Justice Black pointed out,97 presented an issue which could
have been readily resolved under existent precedent. The defendant was a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri,
and with additional places of business in several states other than Washington.98 It had neither offices nor property-except for shoe samples--in Washington. It made no contracts there. It did not deliver the goods in that state,
but shipped them f.o.b. from outside the state. It did, however, employ salesmen
in Washington to solicit orders there. These salesmen were residents of Washington and their time was fully engaged by the defendant for services to be
performed primarily within that state. The salesmen rented display rooms
within the state, for the cost of which they were reimbursed by the defendant.
Their commissions for the years in question exceeded $31,000 per annum. The
record clearly suggests that the method of doing business in Washington was
adopted with a view to avoiding both the legislative and judicial power of
that state.9 9
See, e.g., Haffer, Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations as Defendants in the
United States Supreme Court, 17 B. U. L. Rev. 639 (1937).
'Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 390 (1912).
" 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
See discussion at 584 supra.
' 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
326 U.S. 310, 322 et seq. (1945).

These were Arkansas, llinois, Kentucky, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, New York,
and New Hampshire. Transcript of Record at 15, International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
""Salesmen are employed from the head office in St. Louis and work under the direct
supervision and control of sales managers with offices in St. Louis, and are required as part
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On these facts, the state of Washington sought to recover unemployment
compensation taxes from International Shoe based on the compensation paid to
its salesmen as commissions during the years in question. The amount of taxes
involved was approximately $3,600. The Washington Unemployment Compensation Act'0 authorized the issuance of an order and notice of assessment to
delinquent taxpayers, to be served on the employer in the same fashion as prescribed by the general service statute, i.e., by personal service on employers
found within the state and by registered mail on employers not so found. The
statute provides for review of the assessment by appeal within the state
administrative body and by further appeals through the courts of Washington
on questions of law. The shoe company was served with notice by personal
service on one of its salesmen within the state and by registered mail at its
St. Louis office. It appeared "specially" to contest the jurisdiction of the state
to assess the tax and to contest the in personam jurisdiction of the Washington
tribunals. Throughout the state proceedings, the shoe company asserted that
the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause proscribed the state's legislative jurisdiction and that the Due Process Clause prevented the state from
asserting personal jurisdiction over the corporation. After judgment against it
in the Supreme Court of Washington,'' the shoe company appealed to the
of their duties to spend certain time each year in St. Louis, Missouri, for the purpose of receiving direct personal instructions as to their duties, as to the line of shoes which they are
to offer to the trade, the methods of selling, conditions of selling and to receive information
with reference to construction and new types and kinds of shoes which are to be offered to
the trade. Said employees or salesmen are given a sample line, which samples uniformly
consist of only one shoe of a pair, and no sales are made by salesmen from such samples.
They are merely used to display to prospective purchasers. Some of the salesmen rent sample
rooms in business buildings and the expense of such rental and maintenance is paid by the
salesmen and they are reimbursed on an expense account by the International Shoe Company. Other salesmen maintain no permanent sample rooms, but rent rooms in hotels or
business buildings in the various cities in which they travel....
"Each salesman is given a designated territory in which to solicit orders. The authority
of the salesmen is limited to exhibiting samples of the merchandise for which they solicit
orders to merchants who are probable buyers thereof; endeavor to procure orders on prices
and terms fixed by the International Shoe Company. If order(s) are obtained, to transmit
them to the office of the International Shoe Company outside the state of Washington for
acceptance or rejection and if orders are accepted by the International Shoe Company the
merchandise called for by such orders is shipped F.O.B. shipping point, from outside of the
State of Washington.... The merchandise which is shipped into Washington is invoiced at
the point of shipment and invoices are payable at point of shipment from which collections
are made. No salesman has power or authority to bind the International Shoe Company
to any contract or to finally conclude any transactions in its behalf, the salesmen's duties
and authority being limited strictly to the solicitation of orders.
"The salesmen are under the direct control and direction of the International Shoe Company and are not permitted to be engaged in independently established trade, occupation,
profession or business of the same nature involved in their employment by the International
Shoe Company." Transcript of Record at 16-17, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945).
" Wash. Rev. Code (1951) Title 50.
1 22 Wash.2d 146, 154 P.2d 801 (1945).
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Supreme Court of the United States, which noted probable jurisdiction, 10 2
informed counsel that it did not want to hear argument on the Commerce Clause
question, and transferred the case to its summary docket. 0 3
In its opinion, the Supreme Court quickly disposed of the Commerce Clause
question on the basis of congressional legislation:
S..

53 Stat. 1391, 26 U.S.C. §i606 (a) provides that "No person required under a

State law to make payments to an unemployment fund shall be relieved from compliance therewith on the ground that he is engaged in interstate or foreign commerce,
or that the State law does not distinguish between employees engaged in interstate or
foreign commerce and those engaged in intrastate commerce." It is no longer debatable
that Congress, in the exercise of the commerce power, may authorize the states, in
specified ways, to regulate interstate commerce or impose burdens upon it. Kentucky
Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 299 U.S. 334; Perkinsv. Pennsylvania,
314 U.S. 586; Standard Dredging Corp. v. Murphy, 319 U.S. 306, 308; Hooven &
Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 679; Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S.
761, 769.104

The Court might as easily have disposed of the question of in personam jurisdiction. Washington had laid no claim to a power to exclude International Shoe
from carrying on its business within the state, and therefore did not rest on a
power to extort the corporation's consent to service. Instead, the Washington
court found the defendant to be "present" within the jurisdiction by reason of
the business which it carried on there:
While we are of opinion that the regular and systematic solicitation of orders in
this state by appellant's agents, resulting in a continuous flow of appellant's product
into this state by means of interstate carrier, is sufficient to constitute doing business
in this state so as to make appellant amenable to process of the courts of this state,
we are also of the opinion that there are additional activities shown which bring this
case well within the solicitation plus rule.10 5
These additional activities were "the salesmen's... display rooms, and the
salesmen's residence within the state, continued over a period of years
.....
10
In reaching its conclusion, the Washington court relied heavily on Tauza v.
Susquehanna Coal Co., 1 0 7 and Mr. Justice Rutledge's opinion for the Court
S.Ct. 1579 (1945) (not officially reported).
11265

"o"... the Court has what is termed a 'regular' and 'summary' docket. These designations
signify no more, however, than the amount of oral argument to be allowed. In all cases, on
the regular docket ... one hour is allowed on each side for oral argument, unless the Court
grants more time. Two counsel, and no more, are permitted to be heard for each party.
When a case is transferred to the summary docket, only a half-hour argument on each side
is allowed and only one counsel will be heard on the same side." Robertson and Kirkham,
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States 924 (Wolfson and Kurlaid ed.,
1951).
104326

U.S. 310, 315 (1945).

' 22 Wash.2d 146, 169-70, 154 P.2d 801, 812 (1945).
'-325 U.S. 310, 314 (1945).
'220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
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of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 08
as giving a proper interpretation to Green v. Chicago,B. and Q. R.R.,0 9 which
had held that "mere solicitation" was inadequate to sustain personal jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation, and International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 110
which had held that "solicitation plus" provided a sufficient base. It was certainly within reason for the Supreme Court of the United States to have adopted
the same thesis and dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal question on this ground, in reliance on the Harvester case, as Mr. Justice Black
would have had it do."'
Instead, Mr. Chief justice Stone, for all the participating members of the
Court except Mr. Justice Black, wrote an opinion in which he rejected the earlier
notions of "presence" and "implied consent" in the same terms as, and in
reliance on, judge Learned Hand's opinions in Hutchinson v. Chase and Gilbert 2 and Smolik v. Philadelphiaand Reading R.R. 113 In their place he offered
a doctrine sufficiently amorphous to call forth Mr. Justice Black's objection on
the ground that it might prove unduly restrictive of state judicial power. But
after demolishing the "presence" doctrine, in characteristic fashion, 114 Stone
proceeded to use that very word in sustaining the jurisdiction of the Washington
tribunals. 1 5 Implicit in the opinion is the position that the Court was not overruling the earlier precedents, but was substituting an appropriate rationale to
demonstrate their consistency. Stone's rationalization was this:
Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of
the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was
the purpose of the due process clause to insure. That clause does not contemplate that
a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate
defendant with which the state had no contacts, ties, or relations....

But to the extent that a corporationexercises the privilege of conducting activities
within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protections of the laws of that state. The
exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations
'o
134 F.2d 511 (App. D.C, 1943). The Washington court also relied on a plethora of
state authorities, including Hormel & Co. v. Ackman, 117 Fla. 419, 158 So. 171 (1934);
Wheeler v. Boyer Fire Apparatus Co, 63 N.D. 403, 248 N.W. 521 (1933); American Asphalt
Roof Corp. v. Shankland, 205 Iowa 862, 219 N.W. 28 (1928); Dobson v. Maytag Sales
Corp., 292 Mich. 107, 290 N.W. 346 (1940) ; International Shoe Co. v. Lovejoy, 219 Iowa
204, 257 N.W. 576 (1935) ; West Pub. Co. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 720, 128 P.2d 777
(1942); Dahl v. Collette, 202 Minn. 544, 279 N.W. 561 (1938); In re Petition of Northfield
Iron Co., 226 Wis. 487, 277 N.W. 168 (1938).

205 U.S. 530 (1907). See discussion at 584-85 supra.
"o

234 U.S. 579 (1914). See discussion at 584-85 supra.

11326

U.S. 310, 322 (1945).

"See discussion at 583-85 supra.
"1 See discussion at 579-80 supra.
U See Dunham, "Mr. Chief justice Stone," in Mr. justice (Dunham and Kurland eds.,

1957).
-326 U.S. 310, 320-21 (1945).
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arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which
requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most
instances, hardly be said to be undue." 6
It is to be noted, too, that however far Stone was travelling from original notions
of consent, he continued to use the old language of "privilege." It was in sustaining the jurisdiction of the Washington tribunals over this particular action that
the language of the "fairness" test was utilized. For here there "were sufficient
contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just,
according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice,
to enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred there."'' 1 Mr. Justice
Johnson's "eternal principles" thus reappeared.
The Court held that service of process was proper whether considered to have
been accomplished by the personal service on the corporation's salesman within
the state or by the notice mailed to the corporation's home office in St. Louis.
In suggesting that service outside of the state without more would suffice, the
opinion offered the states an opportunity to dispense with the cumbersome
procedure of service on a state official plus extraterritorial notice, the method
suggested in Pennoyer and utilized extensively by the states since. But otherwise, the Court's conclusions on personal jurisdiction were hardly revolutionary.
Mr. Justice Black, however, thought otherwise. For him the rules were clear.
"Certainly a State, at the very least, has power to tax and sue those dealing
with its citizens within its boundaries .... " 118 There is no suggestion that "tax
and sue" were joint rather than several, for he went on to assert that states
had power "to open the doors of its courts for its citizens to sue corporations
whose agents do business in those States."I"9 Here there is no limitation on the
nature of the suit, no requirement that the suit grow out of the business done
within the state, but the proposition is limited to actions by citizens of the state
and not outsiders. For him it followed that the "elastic standards" of "fair
play," "justice," and "reasonableness" could not be used as a "measuring rod"
of state power, for to do so would be to substitute "notions of 'natural justice'"
for the specific mandates of the Constitution. Due process, for him, did not imply such limitations on state power. 120 So long as "proper service can be had"
and the corporation is "doing business" in the state, jurisdiction may be exercised by the state's courts, though he did not say where the criteria for "proper
service" were to be found, nor whether he was using the phrase "doing business" in the same sense that his predecessors had done. In considering Mr.
Justice Black's position, it should not be forgotten that he was once of the
"

8

Id., at 319 (emphasis added).

Id., at 320.
"0 Id., at 323.
n9 Id., at 324.
See Cardozo, The Reach of the Legislature and the Grasp of Jurisdiction, 43 Cornell
L. Q. 210 (1958).
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mind that the Due Process Clause afforded no protection to corporations in
121
any event, whatever its content.
The third issue presented to the Court evoked no disagreement. Washington
clearly had the right to impose a tax "on the privilege of employing appellant's
salesmen within the state measured by a percentage of the wages.... The right
to employ labor has been deemed an appropriate subject of taxation in this
country and England, both before and since the adoption of the Constitution."' 2 2
If the InternationalShoe case was the beginning of a new formulation of
doctrine for personal jurisdiction, it contains only a statement of policy when
"what are needed are rules of a fairly definite character ... policy alone will
not suffice [though] any such rules must be firmly based upon considerations of
policy."

23

There are several specific rules which might be derived from the

Court's judgment in International Shoe.
At one point the opinion suggests that the mere fact that the cause of action
arose out of activities of the corporation within the state was sufficient to
sustain jurisdiction. 12 The grandfather of the International Shoe doctrine,
Judge Learned Hand, thought that such a rule would "impose ... too severe a
burden."'125 The argument in its favor is that such a rule would provide the
forum in terms of the fact that "the law to be applied is local law" and the
"facts are local facts."'

26

If not the majority, Mr. Justice Black at least seemed to suggest that the
state of the plaintiff's residence was entitled to provide him with a forum. To
use Professor Dodd's language once again, certainly the "state of plaintiff's
domicile . . . is vitally interested in obtaining justice for its inhabitants ...

and it may be argued that a plaintiff has as much right as a defendant to claim
that the legal battle ought to be fought at his home."' 27 This factor alone as a
basis for jurisdiction would indeed be a startling innovation in Anglo-American
jurisprudence. It is more likely to be viewed as a factor which together with
some other or others would be sufficient to warrant jurisdiction.
With the state itself as plaintiff, it might be argued that legislative jurisdiction, i.e., the jurisdiction to impose the tax, ought to carry with it the judicial
jurisdiction to enforce it. It is possible that the courts of the taxing state might
well provide the only forum available, since the Supreme Court, which has said
that a judgment secured on a tax claim must be enforced in other states, 28s has
not yet said that one state's courts must enforce the tax claims of another
See Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 83 (1938).
'= See discussion at 583 supra.
'326 U.S. 310, 321 (1945).
Dodd,op. cit. supra note 26, at 439.
's Dodd, op. cit. supra note 26, at 437.
'2 Tbid.
See discussion at 589 supra.
uMilwaukee County v. White Co., 296 US. 268 (1935).
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state.129 Certainly if no other forum is available, there is much to be said for
allowing this forum to exercise jurisdiction. Even if, however, other courts were
prepared to enforce the Washington tax claim, 3 0 sound argument might be
made that one state ought not to be compelled to submit its claims to another
state's tribunals for adjudication.
Another important factor to be considered is the extent of the business done
by the defendant within the jurisdiction. When the defendant is prepared to
spend money, time and effort extensively within the state, it does not behoove
him to complain about the necessity for appearing therein to litigate, and
especially is this true where the claim in litigation grows out of the business
done therein.
Since the InternationalShoe case involved all these factors, it is not possible
to determine whether any one of them or any combination of them short of
all would sustain jurisdiction, except insofar as it is clear that those factors
which would properly have grounded jurisdiction under the earlier doctrine
would probably prove satisfactory under InternationalShoe.
Presumably, however, there are negative factors to be taken into consideration as well, factors which, in other cases, would weaken the effect to be given
to those items already listed. Only two appear to have existed in the International Shoe case itself, and neither of them seems of great importance. The first
is the distance between the defendant's executive offices and the place of trial
and the second that defendant's records relevant to the issues here were located
in St. Louis.
Whether this sort of analysis of the equities was what was anticipated by
the "fairness" doctrine is difficult to ascertain. The Supreme Court's own
decisions suggest that a much narrower interpretation might be afforded the
InternationalShoe case. At the very same term of court, Mr. Justice Rutledge
described its holding as being only that " 'mere solicitation' where it is regular,
continuous and persistent, rather than merely casual, constitutes 'doing business', contrary to formerly prevailing notions." 13'
' See Moore v. Mitchell, 281 U.S. 18 (1930) ; but cf. Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S.
1 (1939).
" Missouri, where International Shoe Co. had its principal offices, might have afforded
Washington a forum for the collection of its taxes. See State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm.
v. Rodgers, 238 Mo. App. 1115, 193 S.W.2d 919 (1946) ; but cf. California v. St. Louis Union
Trust Co., 260 S.W.2d 821 (Mo. App., 1953). So, too, might Kentucky, where the defendant
also maintained officers. Ohio ex rel. Duffy v. Arnett, 314 Ky. 403, 234 S.W.2d 722 (1950).
Delaware and New York might not have proved so hospitable. See Detroit v. Proctor, 44
Del. 193, 61 A.2d 412 (1948); Wayne County v. American Steel Export Co., 277 App.Div.
585, 101 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1st Dept., 1950). See, generally, Rest., Conflict of Laws § 610
(1934); Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 Harv. L.
Rev. 193 (1932); Daum, Interstate Comity and Governmental Claims, 33 Ill. L. Rev. 249
(1938) ; Roesken, Out of State Collections, 27 Taxes 955 (1948).
2
Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 422 (1946).
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It was to be several years before further light--or darkness-was to be shed
32
by the Supreme Court on the scope of its new doctrine.
IMl. Traveler's Health Association v. Virginia
The first full-dress opinions to deal with the question of personal jurisdiction
after International Shoe were rendered in Traveler's Health Association v.
Virginia. 33 This case gave the Court no little trouble, for four months after
argument it was ordered reargued and no opinion was forthcoming until seven
weeks thereafter. When the case was decided it revealed a thoroughly divided
court. The majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice Black. Mr. Justice
Douglas wrote a separate concurring opinion, though he also joined in the
opinion of the Court. Mr. Justice Minton, who was joined by Mr. Justice Jackson, thought that there was no case or controversy presented for review, and
disagreed on the merits as well. Justices Reed and Frankfurter thought the
case ripe for adjudication but joined with Minton and Jackson on the merits.
The vote on the merits was thus five to four, with one of the five feeling it
necessary to file an opinion of his own.
Traveler's was a Nebraska nonprofit corporation "having its principal and
only office for the transaction of business in Omaha, Nebraska."'1 34 It had no
"office, officer, official, agent, representative, bank account, or any other real
' 13 5
or personal property, tangible or intangible, located in the State of Virginia.'
All applications for membership in the Association were received by mail in
Omaha. Members were entitled to health insurance benefits on the payment
of regular assessments. All assessments were payable in Omaha; all claims
were to be submitted in Omaha, whence payments were made by mail. New
members were "usually obtained through recommendations of existing members. .... ,,x36 Recommended prospects were sent application blanks and returned them by mail to Omaha, where they were acted upon and if approved
certificates were sent by mail. At the time of the proceedings, Traveler's had
about eight hundred "members" in Virginia.
Virginia law 3 7 required all those selling certificates of insurance in Virginia
to obtain a license from the State Corporation Commission, which license
was obtainable only after providing detailed information satisfactory to the
Commission and filing a consent to be sued in Virginia courts on claims filed
'In the interim the state courts and lower federal courts were trying to apply the new
law. See The Growth of the International Shoe Doctrine, 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 523 (1949).
-'339 U.S. 643 (1950).
'Transcript of Record at 2, Traveler's Health Association v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643

(1950).
Im Ibid.

11 Ibid.

Acts of General Assembly of Virginia, 1928, c. 529, p. 1373, as amended, Acts of General
Assembly of Virginia, 1932, c. 236, p. 434.
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against the licensee, with service of process to be made on the Secretary of the
Commonwealth. Traveler's did not have the necessary permit nor had it applied for one.
Proceedings were initiated before the State Corporation Commission by the
issuance of an order to show cause why a cease and desist order should not
be entered which would restrain Traveler's from advertising for sale and selling
certificates of insurance in Virginia, by mail or otherwise.' 38 Notice of the
entry of the order to show cause was served on Traveler's in Omaha by registered mail. The defendant appeared specially to contest the jurisdiction of
the Commission. After a hearing, on stipulated facts, the cease and desist
order was entered by the Commission and the Commission was "authorized
to give such publicity to the order as it sees fit for the 'information and protection of the public.' (Section 6, Virginia Securities Law ... )1,139 In characterizing its order, the Commission said:
There is no element of compulsion except such as may flow from a dread of publicity
attending such an order. In such cases, the only weapon available to the Commonwealth is to publicly advise that the securities of the respondent do not bear the stamp
of the state's approval and are being presented to the public without regard to the
regulatory laws enacted to protect them. Section 6... imposes no penalties, exacts no
direct toll from those against whom its orders proceed. Its purpose, admittedly limited,
is, after a full consideration of facts adduced in support of charges, to call on those
found to be violating the provisions of the statute to halt and to fully apprise the
140
public of Virginia that to deal with such violators is to deal at their peril.
It, therefore, went on to rule that no personal jurisdiction over the defendant
was necessary to the exercise of its jurisdiction in this matter.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the action of the State
Corporation Commission.141 It held that both legislative and judicial jurisdiction existed by reason of the fact that members of the Association acted in
Virginia as agents to secure new members of the Association there; that remittances were received in Virginia; that the membership certificates mailed from
Omaha were subject to approval by the certificate holder and thus the contracts
were made in Virginia; that the Association investigated claims made by Virginia members which investigations must have taken place in Virginia. It held
that its authority over the Association was justified under International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky and InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington. It did
not suggest that the power of the Commission was limited to publicity, but
'Transcript of Record at 7-9, Traveler's Health Association v. Virginia, 339 US. 643
(1950).
' Transcript of Record at 20, Traveler's Health Association v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643
(1950).
"'Transcript of Record at 27, Traveler's Health Association v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643
(1950).
A Traveler's Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d 263 (1949).
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noted that a penal sanction in the nature of a $500 fine was available against
violators of the act, and that penal sanctions might be enforced by extradition.
In the Supreme Court of the United States, the appellant raised two issues.
It relied not at all on the Commerce Clause, but asserted that the Due Process
Clause protected it against Virginia jurisdiction and that Virginia was barred
by the Postal Clause 42 from prohibiting it from making use of the mails.
But the postal issue was not dealt with in appellant's brief on the merits and
was treated as abandoned.1

43

Despite his dissent in the InternaionolShoe case, Mr. Justice Black said:
We hold that Virginia's subjection of this Association to the jurisdiction of that
State's Corporation Commission in a §6 proceeding is consistent with "fair play and
substantialjustice," and is not offensive to the Due Process Clause.14 No line of distinction was drawn by the majority between legislative and
judicial jurisdiction. Lumping the two as if they were one, the Court said:
In Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53, 62, we recognized that a state has a legitimate
interest in all insurance policies protecting its residents against risks, an interest
which the state can protect even though the "state action may have repercussions
beyond state lines.. .

."

and in Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 316,

we rejected the contention ...that a state's power to regulate must be determined
by a "conceptualistic discussion of theories of the place of contracting or of performance." Instead we accorded "great weight" to the "consequences" of the contractual
obligations in the state where the insured resided and the "degree of interest" that
state had in seeing that those obligations were faithfully carried out. And in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, this Court, after reviewing past
cases, concluded: "due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to
a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' ,45
Had the opinion said no more than this, a conclusion might be justified in
the terms suggested earlier 1 46 that legislative jurisdiction carries with it the
power of the state to enforce its regulatory policy in its own courts. But the
Court, anticipating the question which was to come before it at a later time, 41
went on to state:
Moreover, if Virginia is without power to require this Association to accept service
of process on the Secretary of the Commonwealth, the only forum for injured certificate holders might be Nebraska. Health benefit claims are seldom so large that
Virginia policyholders could afford the expense and trouble of a Nebraska law suit.
"U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 8.
"3339 U.S. 643, 651 n. 4 (1950).

1

Id., at 647-48.

1

'"Id., at 649 (emphasis added).
' See discussion at 591-92 supra.
": See Section V., International Life Insurance Co. v. McGee, at 606 infra.
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In addition, suits on alleged losses can be more conveniently tried in Virginia where
witnesses would be most likely to live and where claims for losses would presumably
be investigated. Such factors have been given great weight in applying the doctrine
of forum non conveniens... And prior decisions of this Court have referred to the
unwisdom, unfairness and injustice of permitting policyholders to seek redress only
in some distant state where the insurer is incorporated. The Due Process Clause does
not forbid a state to protect its citizens from such injustice.' 48

There can be no doubt that this question was not before the Court and need
not have been decided. But Supreme Court dicta, especially in this area, have
proved as efficacious as statements which may properly be classified as holdings.

And once again we have involved another element which was previously discussed: the relevance of the right of the plaintiff's state to impose judicial
jurisdiction on the defendant, especially where it may be said that the claim
arises out of business done within the state by the defendant. The conclusion

reached by the Court on this issue, in addition to being dicta, however, was
inconsistent with the case of Minnesota Commercial Men's Association v.
Benn,'49 which the Court purported to distinguish rather than to overrule.'" °
In the Benn case, on which appellant relied very heavily, the Court had said:
..we think it cannot be said that the Association was doing business in Montana
merely because one or more members, without authority to obligate it, solicited new
members. That is not enough "to warrant the inference that the corporation has
subjected itself to the local jurisdiction, and is by its duly authorized officers or
agents present within the State or district where service is attempted."
It also seems sufficiently clear . . . that an insurance corporation is not doing
business within a State merely because it insures lives of persons living therein,
mails notices addressed to beneficiaries at their homes and pays losses by checks
from its home office....
We conclude that the record fails to disclose any evidence sufficient to show that
petitioner was doing business in Montana within the proper meaning of those words,
and that the court there lacked jurisdiction to award the challenged judgment.151

Two other items in the Black opinion are noteworthy. First is the analogy
to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The suggestion that the question of

jurisdiction over the person and the question of forum non conveniens are
the same was one which Judge Learned Hand had also expressed.'8 2 It would
add to the authorities which may provide content for the rule resulting from

International Shoe, but it hardly would give a sufficiently fixed contour for
guidance of future actions, especially since that amorphous doctrine differs
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. More than this, however, it contains the seeds
of a proposition that federal courts' in personam jurisdiction may be far more
148339

U.S. 643, 648-49 (1950).

"See

339 U.S. 643, 647 (1950).

"'261 U.S. 140 (1923).
- 261 U.S. 140, 145 (1923).
''See Kilpatrick v. Texas and P. Ry., 166 F.2d 788, 791 (C.A.2d, 1948).
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extensive than that of state courts, a proposition which will have to be examined at some other time."" The other matter of note is the implication that
one of the factors to be taken into consideration is the relative economic
abilities of the defendant and plaintiff to underwrite the costs of the lawsuit,
probably in terms of the class to which each belongs rather than his individual capacities.
The majority opinion went on to hold that the service by mail was adequate
notice, as previously indicated by the International Shoe case. And it foredosed consideration of what powers the State of Virginia might have in the
event that the cease and desist order were not obeyed by the Association.
Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion, despite the fact that he also joined
the majority opinion, shows a more careful approach to and analysis of the
problem presented by the immediate issues of the case. He carefully drew the
line between legislative jurisdiction and judicial jurisdiction. Of the former
he said:
The requirements of due process do not, in my opinion, preclude the extension
of Virginia's regulatory scheme to appellant. I put to one side the case where a policyholder seeks to sue the out-of-state company in Virginia. His ability to sue is not
necessarily the measure of Virginia's power to regulate.... It is the nature of the
state's action that determines the kind or degree of activity in the state necessary
for satisfying the requirements of due process. What is necessary to sustain a tax
or to maintain a suit by a creditor.., is not in my view determinative when the
state seeks to regulate solicitation within its borders. 154
He went on to say that the judicial power of the state may properly be used
to enforce its legislative powers:
The requirements of due process may demand more or less minimal contacts than
are present here, depending upon what the pinch of the decision is or what it requires
of the foreign corporation ....

Where the corporate project entails the use of one

or more people in the state for the solicitation of business, in my view it does no
violence to the traditional concept of due process to allow the state to provide protective measures governing that solicitation. That is all that is done here.
I cannot agree that this appeal is premature. Virginia has placed an injunction on
appellants, an injunction which may have numerous consequences, e.g., contempt
prbceedings. There is an existing controversy-real and vital to appellants. 1' 5
Were it not for the last paragraph, it might be inferred that Mr. Justice
Douglas was suggesting that administrative jurisdiction might be broader than
judicial jurisdiction. But the recognition of the judicial nature of the controversy in the case necessarily rejected such a notion.
The Supreme Court has never resolved the question whether personal jurisdiction in
federal courts is a matter governed by Erie principles. See Riverbank Laboratories v. Hardwood Products, 350 U.S. 1003 (1956).
-Id., at 654-55.
-'339 U.S. 643, 652-53 (1950).
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The Court being so closely divided, the minority interpretation of the International Shoe doctrine is necessarily important for future litigation. Although
two members of the minority rested on the Corporation Commission's statement that nothing more was involved here than the power of the state to
publicize Traveler's default,5 6 and therefore would have held that no judicial
issue was presented for decision,157 all four were in agreement that judicial
jurisdiction did not exist in this case. They, too, drew a careful line between
legislative jurisdiction and judicial jurisdiction, and apparently were unwilling
to draw the conclusion that the existence of the former was sufficient to establish the latter."5 s Nor were they willing to accept the proposition that
159
extraterritorial service alone was sufficient notice to a nonresident defendant.
On the issue of judicial power, Mr. Justice Minton, speaking for the entire
minority said:
An in personam judgment cannot be based upon service by registered letter on a
nonresident corporation or a natural person, neither of whom has ever been within
the State of Vhginia. Pennoyer v. Neff....
Service by registered mail is said by the majority to be sufficient where the corporation has "minimum contacts" with the state of the forum. How many "contacts" a
corporation or person must have before being subjected to suit we are not informed.
Here all of appellants' contacts with the residents of Virginia were by mail. No agent
of appellant corporation has entered the State, nor has the individual appellant.
The contracts were made wholly in Nebraska. Under these circumstances, I would
hold that appellants were never "present" in Virginia.
"For the terms 'present' or 'presence' are used merely to symbolize those activities of the corporation's agent within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient
to satisfy the demands of due process." InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington....
As I understand the InternationalShoe Co. Case, the minimum contacts ... must
be "activities of the corporation's agents within the State." There were such contacts
by agents within the State in that case ....160

The Traveler'sHealth case did little to make specific the criteria necessary
to make of InternationalShoe a doctrine which might be applied with some
certainty by other courts in the American judicial system. It clearly indicated,
however, that the new doctrine would be a broader base for sustaining judicial
jurisdiction than had the older doctrines of "presence" and "implied consent."
IV. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.
The third in the series of important recent Supreme Court decisions involving personal jurisdiction of state courts over nonresident defendants was
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.' 61 Once again the issue proved
See discussion at 594 supra.
cf. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
'339 US. 643, 659 (1950).
'Id., at 658-59.
'Ibid.
1n 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
'

'But
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a troublesome one. Only six members of the Court were represented by the
majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Burton. Mr. Justice Black concurred
in the result, which may be read as an objection to some of the language
included by the Court in its opinion or to the failure of the opinion to take
any notice whatsoever of the arguments in the Traveler's Health case. Mr.
Justice Minton wrote a dissent, in which he was joined by Mr. Chief Justice
Vinson, on the ground that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the case on the merits.
The Benguet case was one of a series of lawsuits which had plagued the
courts of many jurisdictions, some so distantly separated as Manila and New
York City. 62 The plaintiff was a resident of and presumably a citizen of
Connecticut. 163 The defendant was a "sociedad anonima" of the Philippines,
which was treated for the purposes of the decision as a corporation created
under the laws of that country. The suit was brought in Ohio. Plaintiff's
claim was that as a shareholder of the corporation she had been wrongfully
denied cash dividends and stock dividends of a value approximating 2.6 million dollars. Although the facts about the operations of the corporation in the
state of Ohio were disputed,164 both the Supreme Court and the Ohio courts
relied on the following as a basis for their decisions:
The company's mining properties were in the Philippine Islands. Its operations there
were completely halted during the occupation of the Islands by the Japanese. During
the interim the president, who was also the general manager and principal stockholder
of the company, returned to his home in Clermont County, Ohio. There he maintained
an office in which he conducted his personal affairs and did many things on behalf

of the company. He kept there office files of the company. He carried on there
correspondence relating to the business of the company and its employees. He drew
and distributed there salary checks on behalf of the company, both in his own favor

as president and in favor of two company secretaries who worked there with him.
He used and maintained in Clermont County, Ohio, two active bank accounts
carrying substantial balances of company funds. A bank in Hamilton County, Ohio,
acted as transfer agent for the stock of the company. Several directors' meetings were
held at his office or home in Clermont County. From that office he supervised policies
dealing with the rehabilitation of the corporation's properties in the Philippines and
he dispatched funds to cover purchases of machinery for such rehabilitation. Thus
he carried on in Ohio a continuous and systematic supervision of the necessarily
limited wartime activities of the company. He there discharged his duties as president
" See Perkins v. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205 (1932) ; Perkins v. Guaranty Trust Co., 274 N.Y.
250, 8 N.E.2d 849 (1937); Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 55 Cal.App.2d 720
132 P.2d 70 (1942) ; see also Seavey, Res Judicata with Reference to Persons Neither Parties
nor Privies-Two California Cases, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 98 (1943).
1 Brief for Petitioner at 9, Perkins v. Benquet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437
(1952).
16"

Brief for Respondent for Rehearing at 3-7, Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining

Co., 342 US. 437 (1952).
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and general manager, both during the occupation of the company's properties by
the Japanese and immediately thereafter. While no mining properties in Ohio were
o-ned or operated by the company, many of its wartime activities were directed
from Ohio and were being given the personal attention of its president in that State
165
at the time he was served with summons.
As indicated, service of process on the corporation was made in Ohio by
service on its president and general manager.
The defendant appeared specially in the Ohio Court of Common Pleas,
where the action was initiated, to quash service of summons. The motion
was granted:
...on the grounds that (1) defendant is a foreign corporation and, therefore,
cannot be served with summons in accordance with the provisions of the Ohio statutes
with reference to service on a partnership, and (2) the business done by the defendant
in Ohio was insufficient to legally authorize service of process upon defendant in
Ohio.166
The orders of dismissal were affirmed by the Ohio Court of Appeals' 67 which
was in turn affirmed by the Supreme Court of that state.'68
At the threshold of this case, as in Traveler's Health, it became necessary
for the Supreme Court of the United States to resolve a question of its own
jurisdiction, for the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court was in the form of
syllabi, none of which purported to rest decision on the Fourteenth Amendment. If the decision of the Ohio court rested on adequate, independent state
grounds, there was no basis for the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme
Court. 69 Ordinarily, where it appears that the state court judgment might
have rested on an adequate state ground, the Supreme Court has refused to
review the case.17 0 Occasionally, under such circumstances, the Supreme Court
had remanded or continued the case in order to obtain from the state court
a clarification of its basis for decision. 7 ' In the instant case, the Court, over
'6342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952).
1 155 Ohio St. 116, 118, 98 N.E.2d 33, 35 (1951).
2"" 88 Ohio App. 118, 95 N.E.2d 3 (1950).
218 155 Ohio St. 116, 98 N.E.2d
33 (1951).
21 Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26
(1945).
'See Klinger v. Missouri, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 257, 267 (1871); Johnson v. Risk, 137 US.
300, 307 (1890) ; Allen v. Arguimbau, 198 U.S. 149, 154-55 (1908) ; Adams v. Russell, 229
U.S. 353, 358-62 (1913) ; Cuyahoga Power Co'. v. Northern Realty Co., 244 U.S. 300, 303304 (1917); Lynch v. New York ex rel. Pierson, 293 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1934); Woolsey v.
Best, 299 U.S. 1 (1936); McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U.S. 2 (1940); White v. Ragen,
324 U.S. 760, 765-67 (1945); Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211 (1946); Hedgebeth v.
North Carolina, 334 US. 806 (1948).
'See Loftus v. Illinois, 334 U.S. 804 (1948); Young v. Ragen. 337 U.S. 235 (1949); cf.
Honeyman v. Hanan, 300 U.S. 14 (1937); Parker v. Los Angeles, 338 U.S. 327, 322-33
(1949) ; See also Wo]fson and Kurland, Certificates by State Courts of the Existence of a
Federal Question, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 111 (1949).
Even when a certificate is secured, the result may be an unhappy one unless it reveals an
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the dissents of Vinson and Minton, chose to violate its position on rendering
decisions which might be purely advisory:
The only opinion accompanying the syllabus of the court below places the concurrence of its author unequivocally upon the ground that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the Ohio courts from exercising jurisdiction
over the respondent corporation in this proceeding. That opinion is an official part
of the report of the case. The report, however, does not disclose to what extent,
if any, the other members of the court may have shared the view expressed in that
opinion. Accordingly, for us to allow the judgment to stand as it is would risk an
affirmance of a decision which might have been decided differently if the court below
72
had felt free, under our decisions, to do so.1
It was undoubtedly true that Mr. Justice Taft of the Ohio Supreme Court
rested his opinion on an interpretation of International Shoe which was
patently erroneous. 173 He believed that InternationalShoe had held Tauza v.
Susquekanna Coal Co. to be error in allowing in personam jurisdiction to
attach where the cause of action did not arise out of the business done by the
defendant corporation within the state. But there was no indication that any
of the other six justices of that court agreed with this conclusion.
The opinion of the Supreme Court in the Benguet case may reflect nothing
more than a specific approval of the Tauza rule:
.. . if the . . . corporation carries on . . . continuous and systematic corporate

activities as it did here-consisting of directors' meetings, business correspondence,
banking, stock transfers, payment of salaries, purchasing of machinery, etc.-those

activities are enough to make it fair and reasonable to subject that corporation to
proceedings in personam in that state, at least insofar as the proceedings in personam
seek to enforce causes of action relating to those very activities or to other activities
of the corporation within the state.
The instant case takes us one step further to a proceeding in personam to enforce
a cause of action not arising out of the corporation's activities in the state of the

forum. Using the tests mentioned above we find no requirement of federal due process
that either prohibitsOhio from opening its courts to the cause of action here presented
or compels Ohio to do so. This conforms to the realistic reasoning in International
Shoe.... 174
unambiguous resolution of a federal question as an indispensable ingredient of the state
court's judgment. For the futility of the Supreme Court's judgment in Covey v. Somers, 351
U.S. 141 (1956), which was properly disregarded by the New York Court of Appeals, see 2
N.Y.2d 250, 140 N.E2d 277 (1957), review denied 354 U.S. 916, 919 (1957).
1T 3 4 2

U.S. 437, 443 (1952).

*2 Ohio St. 116, 120, 98 NXE.2d 33, 35, (1951). On remand, after judgment, it was ir.
Justice Taft who alone of that court wanted to hold that it was state law which had called
for the result. 158 Ohio St. 145, 107 N.E.2d 203 (1952).
-7'342 U.S. 437, 445-46 (1952).
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The necessity for stating that due process did not compel the Ohio courts
to take jurisdiction was in response to an argument of petitioner, who urged
discrimination as a ground for reversal an argument which might have rested
better on the Equal Protection Clause.
By way of dictum, a form of indulgence which seems to be practiced by
the Court with uncommon regularity in cases involving questions of in personama jurisdiction, the opinion suggested that the mere presence of a corporate
official within the state on business of the corporation would suffice to create
jurisdiction if the claim arose out of that business and if service were made
175
on him within the state.
Two other factors were present in this case which might well have called
forth comment from the Court. In the Traveler's case, Mr. Justice Black had
hinted that the possibility of suit by way of a quasi-in-rem action within the
state, because of the existence there of property of the defendant, tangible or
intangible, would suffice as a basis for asserting in personam jurisdiction. 7 6
Such a position would directly overrule the holding in Pennoyer v. Neff' 77
and, aside from the Black dictum, there is no reason to suppose that the
Court is yet prepared to take such a step. The other factor is one suggested
but not elucidated by petitioner's brief: whether an alternative forum existed
for the assertion of the plaintiff's claim. It has already been suggested that
the absence of another appropriate forum is a proper factor to consider, at
least in terms of a state's own action under its legislative jurisdiction. It
would have been starkly presented here if the Philippines had been still occupied by enemy forces at the time the action was instituted, for in that event
there might be no other forum available to plaintiff. Since the Philippine courts
were open, however, the petitioner's suggestion was rather that because the
Philippine Court was a foreign tribunal, there was an absence of an adequate
alternative forum. 178 Strangely enough this suggestion, which properly derives
from the doctrine of forum non conveniens, 79 was offered by the petitioner
as an argument for the proposition that the Ohio courts should be prevented
from elevating the doctrine of forum non conveniens to a constitutional status.
Again, however, it points up the possibility, already suggested, 180 of a close
identity of the International Shoe doctrine with the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.
" Id., at 444-45.
1-339 U.S. 643, 649 (1950).
'"See discussion at 570-73 supra. But cf. Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 339,

316 P.2d 960 (1958).
" Brief for Petitioner at 14, Perkins v. Benguet Consoidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437

(1952).
" See Dismissal of Suits Brought by a United States Citizen Where Alternative Forum Is
Abroad, 25 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 377 (1958); Forum Non Conveniens-Trial Court's Discretion Limited Where Forum Non Conveniens Would Force American Plaintiff to Sue in
Foreign Courts, 103 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 830 (1955).
"' See discussion at 596 supra.
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In the 1952 Term, a case came to the Court, not from a state court, but
from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in which the majority of the
Court refused to deal with any issue of in personam jurisdiction, over the
vehement dissent of Mr. Justice Black, speaking for himself and for Mr. Justice Jackson. In Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 181 the petitioner had sued
the respondent in a state court of Florida for an alleged libel. The plaintiff
lived in Florida. The defendant was an Iowa corporation. The allegedly
libelous materials appeared in Look magazine, a publication with wide national circulation, including Florida. The defendant maintained no offices in
Florida. It sold its magazines-to two wholesalers for distribution throughout
the state. (Presumably, it delivered magazines by mail to its subscribers in
Florida.) The only employees of the defendant who entered the state were
two "circulation roadmen" whose job it was to visit retail outlets to encourage
and check on retail sales. These men worked a multi-state area which included
Florida.
The defendant corporation removed the action to the federal district court
on the ground of diversity of citizenship. After the removal, service of process
was made on one of the "circulation roadmen." In the state action, service
had been made on an agent of one of the distributors. In the federal court,
the defendant "moved the court 'to dismiss this action or in lieu thereof
to quash the return of purported or attempted service of the additional
summons ....

2)"182

Although the section patently deals with matters of venue, 5 3 the district
court "dismissed the action on the ground that it did 'not have jurisdiction
under Section 1391, sub-section C, New Title 28, United States Code' because
Respondent 'was not, at the time of the service of the summons doing business
in [the Southern District of Florida].'" The Fifth Circuit affirmed on the
same ground.' 8 4 Mr. Justice Minton, writing for himself, Mr. Chief Justice
Vinson and Justices Reed and Clark, a majority of the Court, 8 5 held that in
an action removed to the federal court from the state court, the governing
venue provisions were contained in Section 1441 (a)186 and not in Section
!S1 3 4 5

U.S. 663 (1953).

' Id., at 664.

62 Stat. 935, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(c) (1948): "A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and
such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes."
- 197 F.2d 74 (CA.Sth, 1952).
'Justices

Frankfurter and Douglas did not participate. 345 U.S. 663, 667 (1953).

"Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought
in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction,
may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.' 62
Stat. 937, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(a) (1948).
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1391 (a). For that reason, venue was proper and the courts below had erred
in dismissing the action under Section 1391 (c). The Court refused to pass on
the question of personal jurisdiction, saying that it had not been decided by
the two lower courts and had been specifically renounced as an issue by both
petitioner and respondent. 8 7 It remanded the case to the district court for a
determination of the question whether that court had acquired jurisdiction
s
over the defendant "by proper service."188
On the majority's construction of respondent's motion in the trial court,
no question of personal jurisdiction need have been litigated on the remand.
The defendant having moved-according to the majority's construction-for
dismissal for improper venue and to quash service of the summons, defendant
was precluded from thereafter raising the issue of in personam jurisdiction. 18 9
The question which was remanded to the trial court was rather whether the
person served by plaintiff was such an agent as would be likely to inform the
defendant of the service. That is, the question was one of adequacy of notice
and not one of jurisdiction over the person. The distinction had been carefully drawn by Mr. Chief Justice Stone in the InternationalShoe case.
Mr. Justice Black read the record very differently. First, he assumed that
the issue of in personam jurisdiction over the defendant was raised by the
defendant's motion in the trial court and resolved by the two lower federal
courts adversely to the plaintiff. Second, he assumed that the issue of in
personam jurisdiction-in terms of "doing business"--would be open on the
remand of the case to the trial court. He indicated quite clearly that he was
prepared to resolve the question of in personam jurisdiction in favor of the
plaintiff. And he did so in rather strident terms. He had, by this time, apparently become enamored of the InternationalShoe doctrines which he had
originally rejected so forcefully: "Whether cases are to be tried in one locality
or another is now to be tested by basic principles of fairness, unless, as seems
possible, this case represents a throwback to what I consider less enlightened
practices."' 90 Then, merging the questions of adequacy of service with the
question of jurisdiction over the person, he found it "ludicrous" that any
such question should be considered after three years of litigation.
The more interesting portion of his opinion, however, is concerned not
with the in personam jurisdiction of state courts but rather with that of the
federal courts. It contains the suggestion, similar to that which he had put
forth in Traveler'sHealth, that the new federal forum non conveniens statute' g'
345 U.S. 663, 667 n. 3 (1953).
'18Id., at 667.
" See Rule 12(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 2 Moore's Federal Practice
Ir 12.23 (2d ed., 1948). Rule 12 (b) carefully distinguishes between improper service and want
of personal jurisdiction as a basis for a motion to dismiss.
'345 U.S. 663, 670 (1953).
62 Stat. 937, 28 U.S.CA. S 1404(a) (1948): "For the convenience of parties and -witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
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resolved all problems of this sort for federal courts. Since the defendant had
not denied that it could be sued in some court, the case should be remanded
to the federal district court "unless Cowles can show that court that it would
be in the interest of justice to try the case in another district."'9 2 The failure
of the Court so to use the new statute was labelled by Black as a refusal "to
93
discard old outdated concepts for the new rule of convenience and fairness."'
The interesting content of this suggestion is threefold: first there is the
previously suggested analogue between the standards of forum non conveniens
and those of the Due Process Clause for personal jurisdiction; second is the
rejection of the notion that the jurisdiction of the district court in removal
actions is derivative and thus dependent upon the jurisdiction of the state
court; and third that a federal district court's in personam jurisdiction is
nationwide, since any defect could be cured by transfer to the appropriate
district. 19 4 There is no suggestion in other Supreme Court opinions that so
radical a change is likely to come about. There is certainly nothing in the
legislative history of Section 1404 (a) to suggest that it was intended to accomplish so broad a revision of in personam jurisdiction. 19 " Indeed, there is
nothing in that history to suggest that it intended any changes whatsoever in
matters of in personam jurisdiction.
Mr. justice Burton wrote a short, calm opinion reaching the same conclusion as Mr. Justice Black, that the majority should have ruled on the
question of in personam jurisdiction. But unlike Black he found in the majority's opinion no animadversions on the International Shoe rule or any
district or division where it might have been brought." Cf. S 1406(a): "The district court of
a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss,
or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case t' any district or division in which it
could have been brought."
"There are grounds for suggesting that the section should not be applied to cases removed
from state courts. See Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 908,
934-35 (1947). But cf. Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949) ; White v. Thompson, 80 F.Supp.
411 (N.D. Ill., 1948) ; Rhodes v. Barnett, 117 F.Supp. 312 (S.D.N.Y., 1953) ; Chicago, R.I.
& P. Ry. Co. v. Igoe, 212 F.2d 378 (C.7th, 1954)." Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 405, 408 n. 14 (1955).
-345 U.S. 663, 671 (1953).

"3

Ibid.

Prior to 1948, Mr. justice Jackson, who joined Black's opinion, had stated, on behalf of
the Court, that requirements of jurisdiction and venue must be met before any question of
choice of forum under forum non conveniens could be put. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501, 504 (1947). And Judge Learned Hand, who had earlier suggested the similarity
'

of tests for forum non conveniens and in personam jurisdiction did not think it followed
that § 404(a) created nationwide jurisdiction in federal courts, which would be the result
of the view expressed by Black in Polizzi. See Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, 181 F.2d 949
(C.A.2d, 1950).

'See Currie, op. cit. supra note 191, at 416-38. The exacerbation of the problem dealt
with by Professor Currie in his admirable article, were the changes implicit in Black's suggestion to take place, is awesome.
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suggestion that the case could not be tried in the district court for want of
in personam jurisdiction.
V. McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co.
The fourth Supreme Court case in this series was the first of two decided
during the 1957 Term of Court: McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co.' 96
Like the cases on in personam jurisdiction which immediately preceded it, the
case presented the Court with a serious question of its own jurisdiction. The
Court overcame that difficulty this time, however, by ignoring it and was able
to produce an opinion in which all the participating members of the Court
could join. 97
The facts were not in contest. In April, 1944, the petitioner's son, Franklin,
took out an insurance policy on his life with the Empire Mutual Insurance
Company, described by the Court as an Arizona corporation. The policy called
for payment of $5,000 in the event of the accidental death of the insured and
for specified benefits for loss of time during illness9s It also provided specifically that no payments would be made in the event of death by suicide. 199
Premiums were to be paid at the rate of one dollar per month.200 The policy
also provided that it should be deemed to have been made in Phoenix and
that any liability thereon should be deemed to arise there.20 ' In 1948, the
respondent, a Texas corporation, undertook to assume Empire Mutual's insurance obligations and issued a reinsurance certificate by mail to Franklin in
California after he acquiesced in the substitution. The new agreement called
for the same terms as its predecessor, except that Austin, Texas was substituted
for Phoenix, Arizona as the place of "making" and the place where liability
should be deemed to arise.20 2 Thereafter, respondent mailed premium notices
to Franklin in California who, in turn, mailed his premium payments to respondent in Texas. Franklin died in 1950. Petitioner, the beneficiary under the
policy, presented her claim by mail. It was rejected on the ground that death
20 3
had occurred by suicide.
Petitioner then filed suit in California and made service on respondent only
by mail, in accordance with the California Unauthorized Insurers Process
Act.20 4 The respondent did not appear and a default judgment was entered
against it 20 5 Unable to execute on the judgment in California, however,
'355

U.S. 220 (1957).

The Chief Justice had recused himself. Id., at 224.
Transcript of Record at 21-36, McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220
(1957).

mId., at 30.
'Id., at 35.

Id., at 21-36.
'Id.,

at 33.

Id., at 17:

1 Cal Insurance Code (Deering, 1950) 5S 1610-20.

Transcript of Record at 18-20, 50-52, McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355
U.S. 220 (1957).
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petitioner brought suit on the judgment in Texas. Both the trial court and the
Texas Court of Civil Appeals denied relief on the ground that the California
judgment violated the Due Process Clause. 20 6
Mr. Justice Black wrote the opinion for the Court. At the outset he stated:
"It is not controverted that if the California court properly exercised jurisdiction over respondent the Texas courts erred in refusing to give its judgment
full faith and credit."201 Indeed, it was not controverted, for the ample reason
that no issue of full faith and credit had been raised by the petition for certiorari or in petitioner's brief on the merits or, so far as the record reveals, in
the Texas courts. Nor was there any indication whatsoever in the opinion of
the Texas court that it passed on any such question. Thus, no federal ground
for enforcement of the California judgment was in issue and in its absence
the Supreme Court of the United States lacked jurisdiction to entertain the
20 8
case.
Ignoring the jurisdictional defect, the Court acknowledged "that neither
Empire Mutual nor respondent has ever had any office or agent in California.
And so far as the record before us shows, respondent has never solicited nor
done any insurance business in California apart from the policy involved
here." 20 9 Thus, the connection of the law suit with California was more tenuous
than in any case in which the Supreme Court had ever sustained jurisdiction
over an absent defendant. In the opinion, Mr. Justice Black once again reverted
to the language of InternationalShoe which he had at first considered anathema. And he found that jurisdiction properly attached in the California court.2 10
He placed specific emphasis on the propriety of jurisdiction where the defendant
is called on "to defend himself in a State where he engaged in economic
activity," 21 apparently however slight that engagement might be:
It is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract
which had a substantial connection with that State.... The contract was delivered
in California, the premiums were mailed there and the insured was a resident of that
State when he died. It cannot be denied that California has a manifest interest in
providing effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to
212
pay claims.
He also reverted to the proposition that an insured was not in a position to
bear the cost of litigation away from home so well as the insurer and to the
fact that the evidence necessary to the resolution of the contest was to be found
in California. The latter must be weighed more heavily than the former since,
under the circumstances of a case such as this, the insured or beneficiary will
-0'288 S.W.2d 579 (Tex.CivApp., 1956).
- 355 U.S. 220, 221 (1957).
62 Stat. 929, 28 U.S.CA. § 1257(3) (1948). See text and cases cited at note 170 supra;
Cox v. Texas, 202 U.S. 446, 451 (1906) ; but cf. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).

-355

U.S. 220, 222 (1957).

mIbid.

I Id., at 223.
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be forced, even if he secures a judgment, to take it elsewhere in order to
enforce it
The opinion does not suggest that California was an appropriate forum
because in part the subject of the insurance policy was located there and was
given the protection that California laws and facilities afforded. If the
citation of Zacharakis v. Bunker Hill Mutual Ins. Co.213 by the Court was
meant as an indication of approval, however, the presence of the subject of
the insurance within the state was not a necessary factor. There suit had been
brought in New York pursuant to a statute similar to the one involved in the
McGee case. The insurance was secured by an agent of the insured by a telephone call to the defendant insurance company in Philadelphia. The subject of
the insurance was property located in New Hampshire. The insured, however,
lived in New York, the policy was mailed to New York from Philadelphia, and
premiums were mailed from New York to Philadelphia. These factors, said the
New York court, partially in reliance on Traveler's Health, were sufficient ties
with New York to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction there over the Pennsylvania corporation in a suit on the policy.
If it did nothing more, McGee disposed finally of the Benn case,214 which had
been cited with approval in InternationalShoe,21 5 and distinguished in Traveler's Health.21 6 Although relied upon by the respondent in McGee, it went to its
death unnoticed in the Court's opinion. Equally irrelevant, so far as the Court
was concerned, were the terms of the contract specifying the "place" of the
"making" and "liability."
The importance of the commercial element noted in the opinion is underlined
by a decision of the Court at the previous Term which also had been written by
Mr. Justice Black. In Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt,217 the Court was asked to decide whether Nevada, which had jurisdiction over the husband who was domiciled there, could render a judgment binding'on the wife who had been served
in New York, which judgment would foreclose her rights to alimony. There was
no question but that under the decisions of the Court, the wife's relation to the
State of Nevada was adequate under the circumstances to warrant the Nevada
court's power to end the marital status of the parties. Nonetheless, the Court
held Nevada without authority to enter a personal judgment against the wife
foreclosing her claims for support:
It has long been the constitutional rule that a court cannot adjudicate a personal
claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Here,
the Nevada divorce court was as powerless to cut off the wife's support right as it
would have been to order the husband to pay alimony if the wife had brought the
1

281 App.Div. 487 120 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1st Dept., 1953), cited at 355 U.S. 223 n. 2; cf.

Schutt v. Commercial Travelers Mutual Acident Ass'n, 229 F.2d 158 (CA.2d, 1956).
2n, Minnesota Commercial Men's Ass'n v. Bern, 261 U.S. 140 (1923).
326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).

212

See discussion at 596 supra.

21

354 U.S. 416 (1957).
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divorce action and he had not been subject to the divorce court's jurisdiction.
Therefore, the Nevada decree, to the extent it purported to affect the wife's right
to support, was void . .. 18
There is no discussion of why the wife was not subject to the jurisdiction of the
Nevada court under the circumstances. It is true that the result in this case is
perfectly consistent with earlier decisions of the Court.2 ' 9 But no reason is offered why the rigid doctrines of Pennayerhave been modified in all other areas
by InternationalShoe but not in this one.2 0 It is indeed difficult to distinguish
McGee from Vanderbilt, in terms of the defendant's connection with the forum,
except on the ground that International Life's relationships with California grew
out of its "economic activity." A second possibility exists, that the expansion
of the jurisdiction of the state courts is to be limited to cases in which the
defendant is a foreign corporation. But this would seem to be rebutted by Mr.
Justice Black's own language in McGee: "Looking back over the long history
of litigation a trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible
scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents." 22 '
To say that the commercial element is an important one is not, of course, to
Id., at 418-19.
"Possibly the most flagrant misapplication that the term in rem has ever received
is in matrimonial actions ....To sustain the constitutional power to grant relief on constructive service against non-residents, the courts found a res in the marital status or marital relation and then proceeded to give it a situs at the marital domicile. There is no more a res
here than between persons to any contract. It is all a fiction. The formula evolved in
Pennoyer v. Neff is, however, satisfied. The truth is that the courts saw the necessity, if
divorce laws were to be carried out in any measure, of permitting divorces to be obtained
in that way under certain circumstances. The fictions led to trouble in this class of cases
with the result that we have parties married in one state and divorced in another. The
difficulty came with the conception of a divisible res after the initial conception of a res.
Courts will eventually reach the point of permitting a conclusive adjudication by the courts
of the state in which one of the married parties is domiciled although the defendant, a nonresident, is served constructively." Carey, op. cit. supra note 36, at 171. Professor Carey was a
true prophet with regard to the dissolution of the fiction with reference to divorce; the fiction would seem to have had continued effect so far as alimony is concerned.
' Mr. Justice Frankfurter's stinging dissent points out the lack of warrant for suggesting
that there was jurisdiction to grant the divorce but no jurisdiction to resolve the issue of alimony between the parties. "No explanation is vouchsafed why the dissolution of the marital
relation is not so 'personal' as to require personal jurisdiction over an absent spouse, while
the denial of alimony incident thereto is. Calling alimony a 'personal claim or obligation'
solves nothing. I note this concern for 'property rights,' but I fail to see why the marital relation would not be worthy of equal protection, also as a 'personal claim or obligation.' It
may not be translatable into dollars and cents, but that does not make it less valuable to the
parties. It cannot be assumed, by judicial notice as it were, that absent spouses value their
alimony rights more highly than their marital rights. Factually, therefore, both situations
involve the adjudication of valuable rights of an absent spouse, and I see no reason to split
the cause of action and hold that a domiciliary State can ex parte terminate the marital relation, but cannot ex parte deny alimony. . . ." Id., at 424. See also the dissents of Mr. justice
Harlan, id., at 428 et seq., and Judge Fuld, in the New York Court of Appeals, 1 N.Y.2d 342,
353, 135 N.E.2d 553, 559 (1956).
= 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
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suggest that it is a sine qua non to a state's jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, as the nonresident motorist statutes, from which the new doctrine springs,
clearly demonstrate.
The Court quickly disposed of the only other issue in the McGee case. The
fact that the statute was not applicable until after the contract between Franklin
and the insurance company had been consummated did not bar its application
in this case: "The statute was remedial, in the first sense of that term, and
neither enlarged nor impaired respondent's substantive rights or obligations
under the contract. It did nothing more than provide petitioner with a California
forum to enforce whatever substantive rights she might have against respondent 222

From International Shoe to International Life, the Supreme Court had
evolved a doctrine of non-interference with the exercise of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants by state courts. By use of the "fairness" test, suggested by
Mr. Chief Justice Stone in derivation from Judge Learned Hand, the Court had
made the question of the propriety of such personal jurisdiction a matter of fact
which, for all practical purposes, was not reviewable in the Supreme Court. With
the exception of the single area of alimony decrees, no limitation on state action
of this form had been derived from the Due Process Clause during that time.
But in the very Term in which InternationalLife was decided the Court rendered another decision which, unless it proves to be a sport, forebodes some
change in the Court's approach to these problems.
22 3
VI. Hanson v. Denckla

The unusual unanimity displayed in the InternationalLife case proved to be
illusory. Hanson v. DenCkla224 and Lewis v. Hanson225 were written by the
Chief Justice for a bare majority of five. Mr. Justice Black, the author of the
InternationalLife opinion, dissented on behalf of himself and Justices Burton
and Brennan. Mr. Justice Douglas offered a dissent of his own.
*The facts, though not in dispute, were complicated, not the less for the reason
that the contest was conducted in two separate states at the same time, arriving
at the Supreme Court by different routes: the Denckla case came by appeal
from the Supreme Court of Florida and the Lewis case on certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Delaware. The controversy involved a family dispute over
the distribution of $400,000, part of an estate left by the testatrix-settlor, Dora
Browning Donner.
In 1935, Mrs. Donner, then a domiciliary of Pennsylvania, purported to
create a trust for which the Wilmington Trust Company, a Delaware corporation, was named trustee. Mrs. Donner reserved a life estate in herself and
retained the power to appoint the remainder, either by testamentary disposition
or by inter vivos instrument. She also retained the right to alter, amend, or
Id., at 224. Cf. Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 382-83, 143 N.E.2d 673, 675-76 (1957).
- 357 U.S. 235 (1958).

- 357 US. 235 (1958).

2mIbid.

HeinOnline -- 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 610 1957-1958

1958]

IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION

revoke the trust and the right to change the trustee. In addition, the trustee's
powers over the trust property were restricted by the requirement that before
it could sell or buy securities or engage in certain other specified activities it
must first secure the approval of an "advisor" to be appointed by the settlor.
Shortly after executing the trust in 1935, Mrs. Donner exercised her power
of appointment. In 1939, the power of appointment was revised. In 1944, she
established her domicile in Florida where she remained until her death in 1952.
In 1949, while in Florida, she executed a new will and a new power of appointment under the trust. There was no question but that the execution of the power
of appointment did not satisfy the formalities necessary for a testamentary
disposition under Florida law. The issue presented by the litigation was whether
the property should pass pursuant to the terms of the power of appointment or
in accordance with the residuary clause of the will. This, in turn, depended upon
whether the reservation of powers over the trust assets by the settlor made the
trust illusory. In both Florida and Delaware this was considered a question of
"first impression. ' '2 2 6 Under the power of appointment, the assets of the trust
would pass to two trusts for the benefit of two of Mrs. Donner's grandchildren,
Donner Hanson and Joseph Donner Winsor. The trustee of these trusts, which
were already in existence, was the Delaware Trust Company, a Delaware corporation. Under the will, the $400,000 in issue would go to trusts for the benefit of
two of Mrs. Donner's daughters, Katherine N. R. Denckla and Dorothy R. B.
Stewart.
Upon Mrs. Donner's death in 1952, the Wilmington Trust Company transferred the assets in the 1935 trust to the Delaware Trust Company as trustee
for Donner Hanson and Joseph Donner Winsor. Fourteen months after Mrs.
Donner's death, Mrs. Denckla and Mrs. Stewart, the latter through her
guardian, initiated a proceeding in the Florida courts for a declaratory judgment
"to determine the question of what portion of the trust property involved herein
passes under the residuary clause of the will of the decedent." 22 7 The will had
been probated in Florida. Elizabeth Donner Hanson, a daughter of Mrs. Donner
and mother of Donner Hanson and Joseph Donner Winsor, had been appointed
executrix under the will. 22 8 In the declaratory judgment action, personal juris'Transcript of Record at 187, Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) ; Transcript of
Record at A-244, Lewis v. Hanson, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). See note 273 infra.
'Transcript of Record at 12, Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
The family relationships are indicated by the following chart, which does not purport to
be an accurate reflection of the relative birth dates of the persons named.
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diction was secured over Mrs. Hanson, Donner Hanson and Joseph Donner
Winsor, and over William Donner Roosevelt and Curtis Winsor, Jr., who were
also children of Mrs. Hanson and contingent beneficiaries of the Delaware trusts
for their brothers. All of these were domiciliaries of Florida and service was
made on them there. Neither the Wilmington Trust Company nor the Delaware
Trust Company was served with process in Florida, 229 but a copy of a "Notice
to Appear and Defend" together with a copy of the complaint were mailed to
each of them, by ordinary mail, and notice was published in a Palm Beach
newspaper, pursuant to Florida law.230 Neither of the2 3trust companies appeared
in the Florida litigation or participated in any way. '
Mrs. Hanson and her children, as to whom the Florida court undoubtedly
secured personal jurisdiction, moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that
the nonresident defendants were indispensable parties over whom the Florida
court had failed to secure personal jurisdiction. 232 This, of course, was a question of state law. On this base, the resident defendants also raised a constitutional claim, asserting that an exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendants would be a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.23s They did not suggest that the exercise of such jurisdiction
would deprive the resident defendants of any constitutional rights. The Florida
chancellor dismissed the action as to the nonresident defendants for want of
personal jurisdiction,2. 4 but retained jurisdiction over the resident defendants.
There were other nonresident defendants who were not served in Florida, but they may
be ignored in the consideration of the problems presented to the Court by these cases.
rFla. Stat. Ann. (1957) S§ 48, 48.01, 48.02, set out at 357 U.S. 241 n. 3 (1958).
A default judgment was entered against them. Transcript of Record at 41-42, Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). The final order in the trial court dismissed the case as to
them. Id., at 110-11. But the default judgment was reinstated by the decision of the Florida
Supreme Court. Id, at 181-92.
mId., at 112-19. At this point there was no suggestion that the exercise of jurisdiction over the resident defendants in the absence of indispensable parties contravened the
Due Process Clause; indeed, no such contention is to be found in the record at all. The constitutional attack took the form set out in the following footnote.
' "These defendants are informed and believe that the defendants hereto sought to be
served by constructive process will not submit themselves to the jurisdiction of this Court by
appearing herein. The exercise by this Court of the jurisdiction sought to be invoked by the
plaintiffs herein would contravene the Constitution and, Laws of the State of Florida and
the Constitution of the United States, and, in particular, Section I of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution."' Motion to dismiss, Transcript of Record at
41, Hanson v. Denckla 357 U.S. 235 (1958) ; see also id., at 53, 127, 195. Itis noteworthy that
in the resident defendants' petition for rehearing after the trial court had ruled against them
on the merits and in their favor on the issue of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants,
the Due Process argument was not offered. See id., at 112.
"As to jurisdiction, the trust assets and the trustees are in Delaware. No personal service has been had upon the defendants who failed to answer. The inclusion of the trust assets
in her inventory, and an allowance of counsel fees and compensation for the executrix, although such an inclusion was later sought to be withdrawn, does not of itself give this court
jurisdiction over these assets in Delaware or the Trustees. Hence, this court considers that
it has jurisdiction over the non-answering defendants." Id., at 110-11.
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He held, as to the latter, that the attempted exercise of the power of appointment was a testamentary disposition which did not satisfy the requirements
of Florida law. 35 His conclusion, therefore, was that the $400,000 passed pur236
suant to the will and should go to the Denckla and Stewart trusts.

After the initiation of the Florida proceedings but prior to the decree, Mrs.
Hanson and her children initiated a suit in Delaware for a declaratory judgment as to which parties were entitled to the proceeds of the 1935 trust. All the
parties to the Florida suit, except Mrs. Denckla and Mrs. Stewart, appeared in
the Delaware action. 23 7 The Florida court then enjoined Mrs. Hanson from proceeding with the Delaware action, but it was carried forward by the other parties. After the Florida decree was entered by the trial court, it was offered as a
ground for res judicata in Delaware. But the plea was rejected and the Delaware
chancellor ruled that the trust was a valid trust under Delaware law and that
the power of appointment had been properly exercised to pass the trust assets
to the trusts in favor of Mrs. Hanson's children.m s The prevailing parties in
the Florida suit then urged, on a motion for a new trial in Delaware, that the
"' It seems dear to me, from the authorities, that the power of appointment was testamentary in character and did not constitute a valid inter vivos trust appointment. As the
appointment had only one subscribing witness, rather than two, as required in Florida, it
did not constitute a valid testamentary disposition." Id., at 111.
2wIbid.
' Mr. Chief Justice Warren noted the appearance in Delaware of all but Mrs. Denckla.
357 U.S. 235, 242 (1958). But it would seem that the only appearance for Mrs. Stewart was
by a guardian ad litem appointed by the Delaware court, without any apparent authority
from the guardian in Florida where Mrs. Stewart was domiciled.
'Hanson v. Wilmington Trust Co., 119 A.2d 901 (Del.Ch., 1955). The Delaware court in
speaking of doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel raised questions relevant to the
problem of full faith and credit, though the issue had not been presented at that point: "The
doctrine of res judicata is not applicable because the Florida action and this action involve
different causes of action." Id. at 905. "It is my opinion that it would be contrary to sound
public policy for this Court to consider itself bound and divested of its duty to determine
the essential validity of a Delaware inter vivos trust in a direct proceeding brought for the
purpose on the ground that a Court in a sister jurisdiction has incidentally determined the
matter in another cause of action in which neither the trust res nor the Trustee was before
the Court. The doctrine of collateral estoppel is a judge-made rule. I do not think that it
should be enlarged to the extent of depriving the parties herein of a direct determination by
this Court as to the validity of the Trust.... Moreover, the application of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel might work injustice in this, a case which involves only questions of law.
It could mean that the parties who were before the Court in the Florida action would be
subjected to one conclusion of law while Wilmington Trust Company, Delaware Trust
Company and other appointees and beneficiaries, who did not appear in the Florida action,
would be controlled by a different rule of law. This could mean that (1) as to the parties
before the Florida Court, the disposition of assets would be governed by the residuary
clause of the Will, but (2) as to the parties who were not before the Florida Court, the disposition of assets would be governed by the terms of the 1935 Agreement and the exercise
of the power of appointment thereunder. This would result in chaos and injustice. The
possibility of such result militates against application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel
in any case. See Restatement of Judgments, 5 70 Comment f, 1948 Supp.; Scott 'Collateral
Estoppel by Judgment,' 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 10." Id., at 907.
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Florida decree was entitled to full faith and credit in Delaware. The motion
was denied. The executrix, Mrs. Hanson, then moved the Florida Supreme
Court for an order remanding the case to the Florida trial court with orders to
dismiss the Florida action on the basis of the Delaware judgment. She did not
urge that the Florida court was compelled to abide by the Delaware decree
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The motion was denied.2 3 9
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court sustained the trial court's determination that the trust was invalid, that the power of appointment was invalid, and
that the property passed pursuant to the terms of the will.24 But it reversed
the trial court on the jurisdictional issue and held that the Florida courts could
241
properly exercise in personam jurisdiction over the Delaware corporations.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause was raised by Mrs. Hanson for the first time
on a petition for rehearing2 42 which was denied without comment by the Florida
24

Supreme Court.

3

Thereafter, on appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware sustained the result
reached by its trial court and rejected the contention that it was bound to
244
comply with the Florida decree by reason of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
='Transcript of Record at 192, Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
.4O
Id., at 182-86; see note 273 infra.
" "We next consider the contention made on the cross-appeal that the chancellor erred
in ruling that he lacked jurisdiction over the persons of certain absent defendants, summoned to appear by constructive service of process. These defendants were the trustees and
persons who would benefit tinder the last power of appointment executed under the trust,
and against the will. In Henderson v. Usher... we upheld constructive service of a citizen
of New York, although the trust 'res,' consisting entirely of intangible personalty, was
physically located in New York, and the trust was administered there by the Chase National
Bank, as trustee. We held that constructive service was valid in that state of the record because substantive jurisdiction existed in the Florida court by virtue of construction of a
will, which was also involved, the testator having been domiciled in Florida. We observed
that it was not essential that the assets of the trust be physically in this state in order that
constructive service be binding upon a non-resident where the problem presented to the
court was to adjudicate, inter alia, the status of the securities incorporated in the trust
estate and the rights of the non-resident herein. It is entirely consistent with the Henderson
case to hold, as we do, that the court below erred in ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over the
persons of the absent defendants. With this view of the case, we need not consider the contention of cross-appellees that the absent defendants are necessary parties under Martinez v.
Balbin, Fla., 76 So.2d 488." Id., at 191-92.

2 Id., at 198.

2' Id., at 204.

'"The demand of full faith and credit for the Florida judgment as the prop for the assertion of personal liability against Wilmington Trust Company is defeated by the fact that
Wilmington Trust Company has never been served personally with Florida process, nor has
it appeared in any form in the Florida litigation. The recital of these facts is sufficient to require the denial of full faith and credit to the Florida judgment when it is sought to be
made the basis for the assertion of personal liability." 128 A.2d 819, 831 (Del., 1957). "It is,
of course, true that the courts of Florida may adjudicate with respect to a res within its
boundaries and subject to its control, and full faith and credit may be successfully claimed
for such a judgment in the courts of other states. Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 429.
But a judgment which has the force- of a judgment in rem with respect to assets located in
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Thus, these inconsistent opinions of the highest courts of two sovereign
states of the Union were brought to the Supreme Court of the United States
for resolution.
On the appeal from the Florida judgment, the Supreme Court properly refused to consider the question whether Florida had to give full faith and credit
to the Delaware judgment, inasmuch as that issue had not been timely raised
in the Florida courts. 245 The Supreme Court also held that since the appellants
had not contended that the Florida jurisdictional statute had been unconstitutionally applied, but only that the Florida courts had improperly exercised in
personam jurisdiction, they had failed to raise a question which was a proper
subject for an appeal. 246 The Court, therefore, dismissed the appeal, but treating
the appeal papers as a petition for certiorari, as required by statute, granted
certiorari. 24 7 This left but one question for consideration on the Florida
appeal: were the nonresident defendants properly subjected to the jurisdiction
of the Florida courts? This in turn depended upon whether the resident defendFlorida does not acquire by reason of the full faith and credit clause any extra-territorial
effect upon assets located outside of the State of Florida in the absence of seizure by the
Florida courts. Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 .... To have any extra-territorial
effect such a judgment must have been rendered after the acquisition of personal jurisdiction
over the party claiming the non-Florida assets. Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394.
...The res, over which these parties are contending consists entirely of corporate securities
which at all times since 1935 have been located in Delaware. There has been no seizure of
them by any judicial process in Florida, nor has any person or corporation holding the assets
voluntarily by appearance brought them before the Florida courts." Id., at 831-32.
On the question of privity between the trustees and the beneficiaries, the Delaware Supreme Court said: "... it is impossible to accept on principle the argument that a judgment
against a cestui que trust binds the non-appearing trustee. At the argument, counsel for both
groups stated that they had found no authority so holding, nor have our own researches
disclosed any. Upon reflection, we are not surprised that there is none, for any such rule
might permit a beneficiary by shopping around among jurisdictions to defeat the trust
against the manifest intent of the trustor. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the nonappearing defendants in Florida are not estopped by the judgment on the ground of privity
with appearing defendants." Id., at 835.
In discussing the issue of collateral estoppel, the court announced the public policy of
Delaware in the following terms: "Finally, we think the public policy of Delaware precludes its courts from giving any effect at all to the Florida judgment of invalidity of the
1935 trust.... To give effect to the Florida judgment would be to permit a sister state to
subject a Delaware trust and a Delaware trustee to a rule of law diametrically opposed to
the Delaware law. It is our duty to apply Delaware law to controversies involving property
located in Delaware, and not to relinquish that duty to the courts of a state having at best
only a shadowy pretence of jurisdiction." Ibid.
"r See discussion at 614 supra. The Court cited Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 236 U.S.
128 (1945), for this proposition. See also Robertson and Kirkham, op. cit. supra note 103,
at § 75.
" The Court here cited Wilson v. Cook, 327 U.S. 474, 482 (1945), and Charleston Federal
Savings and Loan Ass'n. v. Alderson, 324 U.S. 182 (1945). See also Robertson and Kirkham,
op. cit. supra note 103, at § 11.
' See Robertson and Kirkham, op. cit. supra note 103, at § 20.
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ants, who were properly the subject of Florida judicial jurisdiction,2 48 could
assert the constitutional defect as to the nonresident defendants who had never
appeared or participated in that litigation at all.
The Supreme Court had, theretofore, on numerous occasions held that where

Supreme Court review of the decision of a state court was sought, the party
seeking review "must show that enforcement of the challenged judgment would
deprive it-not another--of some rights arising under the Constitution or laws
of the United States.1 24 9 In this instance, however, the Court held that the
resident defendants had standing to raise the question because if the nonresidents were not subject to the jurisdiction of the Florida courts, there would
be, according to Florida law, an absence of indispensable parties, and the action
could not go to judgment. The Court thus shifted the test from whether the
resident defendants were asserting a constitutional right of their own to whether
a holding of want of jurisdiction over other defendants would affect the judgment entered against the resident defendants. 250 The suggested test put the
Supreme Court in a very difficult position. The judgment of want of jurisdiction
over the nonresident defendants would affect the judgment against the resident
defendants only if the nonresidents were indispensable parties according to
Florida law. The Court undertook to resolve that question of state law for
itself.251 It decided that the nonresident trustees were indispensable parties
under Florida law although the Florida trial court had clearly held to the
contrary in the judgment it rendered in this very litigation 2s and although the
Florida Supreme Court had announced the question as an open one.253 Mr. Justice Black's suggestion that the case be remanded to the Florida courts for the
resolution of this question of state law254 was rejected, though the Supreme
'"With personal jurisdiction over the executor, legatees and appointees, there is nothing
in federal law to prevent Florida from adjudicating concerning the respective rights and liabilities of those parties. But Florida has not chosen to do so." 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958).
' Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers Cooperative Marketing Ass'n, 276
U.S. 71, 88 (1928); Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405 (1900).
'The Court here relied on Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co, 357 U.S. 235, 245
(1958), where the Liberty Warehouse test was not and could not be in issue.
=' 357 U.S. 235, 254-55 (1958).

'See notes 234 and 235 supra.

See note 241 supra.
' "Even if it be assumed that the Court is right in its jurisdictional holding, I think its
disposition of the two cases is unjustified. It reverses the judgment of the Florida Supreme
Court on the ground that the trustee may be, but need not be, an indispensable party to the
Florida litigation under Florida law.... The Florida judgment is thus completely wiped
out even as to those parties who make their homes in that State, and even though the Court
acknowledges there is nothing in the Constitution which precludes Florida from entering a
binding judgment for or against them.... In my judgment the proper thing to do would be
to bold the Delaware case until the Florida courts had an opportunity to decide whether the
trustee is an indispensable party. Under the circumstances of this case I think it is quite
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Court has, in recent years, frequently if not consistently refused to indulge the
privilege of telling the state courts what the state law should be, especially
where, as here, one construction of the state law leads to the necessity for deciding a constitutional question and another construction would avoid it."5
On the doubtful assumption that the due process question was properly
raised, the Court first addressed itself to the question whether the Florida judgment could be sustained on the basis of in rem jurisdiction. To put that question, however, was to continue to use a fiction which necessarily hinders rather
than helps to formulate an appropriate body of doctrine to guide the courts in
determining whether a given forum is an appropriate one for the determination
of the legal and factual issues which are presented by a law suit. The nature of
the fiction was long ago revealed by Mr. Justice Holmes, among others:
All proceedings, like all rights, are really against persons. Whether they are proceedings or rights in rem depends on the number of persons affected. Hence the res
need not be personified and made a party defendant, as happens with the ship in
admiralty; it need not even be a tangible thing at all, as sufficiently appears by the
case of the probate of wills. Personification and naming the res as defendants are
mere symbols, not the essential matter. They are fictions, conveniently expressing
the nature of the process and the result, nothing more.258
However true it may be that the situs of property should be a factor in the
determination of the appropriate forum for the trial of an action relating to that
property, it ought not to be the exclusive factor.25 7 To speak in terms of in rem
jurisdiction was a reversion to the concept that a court must have physical
power to effectuate its judgment, a concept which contravenes the very principles of the Full Faith and Credit Clause2ss and which rejects the notions
underlying the broadening of jurisdiction over the person which was reflected
in the Supreme Court's decisions from International Shoe to International
probable that they would say he [sic] is not. See Trueman Fertilizer Co. v. Allison, 81 So.
2d 723. I can see no reason why this Court should deprive Florida plaintiffs of their judgment against Florida defendants on the basis of speculation about Florida law which might
well turn out to be unwarranted." 357 U.S. 235, 261-62 (1958).
' "The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity for deciding it.... It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a consti-

tutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.... ." Brandeis, 3., con-

curring in Ashwander v. T.VNA., 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936). Cf. Jackson, J., concurring in
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 127-28 (1945). Herb v. Pitcairn was purportedly distinguished in the majority opinion, see 357 U.S. 235, 255 (1958).
Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 76-77, 55 N.E. 812, 814

(1900).
n' Some of the unfortunate and unnecessary difficulties created by the use of the situs of

property as the sole forum competent to deal with litigation relevant to that property have
been cogently demonstrated by Professor Currie. See Currie, op. cit. supra note 90.
" See discussion at 585 supra.
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Life. 259 In the Denckla case, the Supreme Court said that a court's in rem jurisdiction "is limited by the extent of its power and by the coordinate authority
of sister States."26 But it did not suggest any reason why this should be more
or less true of in rem jurisdiction than of in personam jurisdiction. In either
event the proper test must relate to whether the forum is an appropriate one
for resolving the controversy before it, whatever the rubric attached to the law
suit. On the ground that there was "nothing in the record ... sufficient to establish a situs in Florida" 26' for the trust res, the Court held that there was no
in rem jurisdiction in the Florida courts. Strangely enough, however, in discussing whether some other in rem concepts would be available to establish
jurisdiction in the Florida courts, the Supreme Court returned to the appropriate
question of the relation of the forum to the controversy:
The Florida court held that the presence of the subject property was not essential
to its jurisdiction. Authority over the probate and construction of its domiciliary's
will, under which the assets might pass, was thought sufficient to confer the requisite
jurisdiction. But jurisdiction cannot be predicated upon the contingent role of the
Florida will. Whatever the efficacy of a so-called "in rem" jurisdiction over assets
admittedly passing under a local will, a State acquires no in rem jurisdiction to
adjudicate the validity of inter vivos dispositions simply because its decision might
augment an estate passing under a will probated in its courts. If such a basis of
jurisdiction were sustained, probate courts would enjoy nationwide service of process
to adjudicate interests in property with which neither the State nor the decedent
could claim any affiliation. The settlor-decedent's Florida domicile is equally unavailing as a basis for jurisdiction over the trust assets. For the purpose of jurisdiction in rem the maxim that personalty has its situs at the domicile of the owner
is a fiction of limited utility.... The maxim is no less suspect when the domicile
is that of a decedent. In analogous cases, this Court has rejected the suggestion that
the probate decree of the State where decedent was domiciled has an in rem effect
on personalty outside the forum State that could render it conclusive on the interests
of nonresidents over whom there was no personal jurisdiction.... The fact that the
owner is or was domiciled within the forum State is not sufficient affiliation with the
262
property upon which to base jurisdiction in rem.
In fact, the in rem argument was something of a straw man; it had not been
strongly urged by the appellants and neither of the dissenting opinions chose
to rest on this dying notion. So far as the Florida probate proceedings were
concerned, it was Mr. Justice Black's .dew that they were relevant factors in
deciding the appropriateness of the Florida forum to determine the litigation
in question, but he did not purport to accept the thesis that the estate was a
res over which the state had power sufficient to affect the interests of nonresident
__ See Mr. Justice Jackson's opinion for the Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1950).
o357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958).
Id., at 247.
Id, at 247-49.
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defendants. 26 Mr. Justice Douglas' approving reference2 64 to Mr. Justice Traynor's opinion for the California Supreme Court in Atkinson v. SuperiorCourt2 65
would seem to imply adoption of the result rather than the means of achieving
it, which had been by way of an ingenious doctrine of quasi-in-rem juris266
diction.
On the question of in personam jurisdiction, both the majority and the Black
minority expressed concurrence-if with somewhat different emphasis-in the
proposition that the states were not authorized to exercise nationwide in personam jurisdiction. The Chief Justice asserted that "it is a mistake to assume
that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal
jurisdiction of state courts. See Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt.... " 26 7 The author of
the Vanderbilt opinion, Mr. Justice Black, said: "Of course we have not reached
the point where state boundaries are without significance, and I do not mean
''
to suggest such a view here. There is no need to do so. 268
These two groups were united on another point, that jurisdiction over defendants does not flow as a necessary concomitant of jurisdiction to apply local
law to the controversy. But again the emphasis was different. The Chief Justice
acknowledged that Florida could apply its own law to the question of the
validity of the trust on the ground that the execution of the power of appointment took place there. "For choice-of-law purposes such a ruling may be
justified, but we think it an insubstantial connection with the trust agreement
for purposes of determining the question of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. 2 69 Mr. Justice Black thought the choice of law principles
relevant if not controlling on the question of personal jurisdiction: "True, the
question whether the law of a State can be applied to a transaction is different
from the question whether the courts of that State have jurisdiction to enter a
judgment, but the two are often closely related and to a substantial degree
' "Florida's interest in the validity of Mrs. Donner's appointment is made more emphatic
by the fact that her will is being administered in that State. It has traditionally been the
rule that the State where a person is domiciled at the time of his death is the proper place
to determine the validity of his will, to construe its provisions and to marshal and distribute his personal property. Here Florida was seriously concerned with winding up Mrs.
Donner's estate and with finally determining what property was to be distributed under
her will. In fact this suit was for that very purpose." 357 U.S. 235, 259 (1958).
-357 U.S. 235, 263-64 (1958).
- 49 Cal.2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), cert. denied 357 U.S. (1958). The Atkinson case
was pending in the Supreme Court on petition for certiorari and appeal at the time the
Denckla case was decided. It had been held without decision for a long time. Review was
subsequently denied. The case presented serious questions whether the Supreme Court could
properly entertain jurisdiction, including questions of mootness and finality.
-' "For the reasons stated above,... the multiple contacts with this state fully sustain the

jurisdiction of the superior court to exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction over the intangibles
in question." 49 Cal.2d 338, 348, 316 P.2d 960, 966 (1957).
m 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).

Id., at 260.

Id., at 253.
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depend upon similar considerations. 2 70 Under the circumstances presented by
the case, if the issue were characterized as one of the validity of the trust, Delaware law would seem to be the most appropriate law to be applied.2 71 A characterization of the problem as one of the validity of the exercise of the power
of appointment would seem to warrant the application of Florida law.2 7 2 One
of the major differences between the majority and minority derives from the
difference in the way each characterizes the problem, with Warren choosing the
273
first and Black the second.
These differences in emphasis reveal the essential conflict between the majority and minority in their construction of the "minimal" contacts test which both
purport to derive from InternationalShoe. Warren specifically rejects the notion
of a parallel between forum non conveniens and the appropriate forum under
'Id., at 258. See Professor Curries recent articles on choice of law which would support Black's thesis of the relevance of choice of law criteria to choice of forum criteria. Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 Stanford L.
Rev. 205 (1958); Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25
U. of Chi. L. Rev. 227 (1958).
' See, e.g., In re Pratt's Trust, 5 App.Div.2d 501, 172 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1st Dept., 1958);
National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Cumming, 325 Mass. 457, 91 N.E.2d 337 (1950);
Warner v. Florida Bank & Trust Co., 160 F.2d 766, 771 (C.A.Sth, 1947); Wilmington Trust
Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 26 Del.Ch. 397, 24 A.2d 309 (S.Ct., 1942) (this case also involved a Donner family trust); Rest., Conflict of Laws §294(2) (1934).

See, e.g., Maynard v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 208 App.Div. 112, 203 N.Y.S. 83
(1st Dept., 1924), aff'd 238 N.Y. 592, 144 N.. 905 (1924) ; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws §177
(3d ed., 1949).
' Thus, it was Warren's position that "It is the validity of the trust agreement, not the
appointment, that is at issue here." 357 U.S. 235, 253. But Black took this position: "In my
judgment it is a mistake to decide this case on the assumption that the Florida courts invalidated the trust established in 1935 by Mrs. Donner while she was living in Pennsylvania. It
seems quite clear to me that those courts had no such purpose. As I understand it, all they
held was that an appointment made in Florida providing for the disposition of part of the
trust property made after Mrs. Donners' death was (1) testamentary since she retained
complete control over the appointed property until she died, and (2) ineffective because
not executed in accordance with the Florida statute of wills." Id., at 256-57, n. 1. Whatever
Mr. Justice Black's understanding, the Florida Supreme Court certainly stated that they
were passing on the validity of the trust: "The validity of an attempted inter vivos trust
such as this is a matter of first impression in this state." No. 170, R. 187. "Although any of
these reservations of power in the settlor, standing alone, might not have been enough to
render the trust invalid ... the cumulative effect of the reservations was such that the relationship established divested the settlor of virtually none of her day-to-day control over
the property or the power to dispose of it on her death, and the trust was illusory." Id.,
at 189. "We reemphasize that we do not, and need not, hold that the reservation of the power
of appointment, or any other factor standing alone, would suffice to invalidate the remainder
interests sought to be created under this trust. It is enough to observe that if, as to the remaindermen, this trust is not invalid as an agency agreement, and testamentary as the court
below found, it is difficult to understand what further control could be retained by a settlor
to produce this result, and the principles to which we have alluded above would lose their
meaning." Id., at 191. Cf. the quotation from Mr. Justice Black's opinion at note 263 supra,
where he suggests that the place of probate of the will offers a basis for applying Florida law.
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Due Process Clause: a state court "does not acquire that jurisdiction by being
the 'center of gravity' of the controversy, or the most convenient location for
litigation.1 2 74 and, more fully:

Those restrictions [on in personam jurisdictionJ are more than a guarantee of
immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are consequences of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States. However minimal the
burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to
do so unless he has had the '"inimal contacts" with that State that are a prerequisite
to its exercise of power over him. ... 275
Thus, for Warren and the majority, the test was whether there were sufficient
contacts between the nonresident defendants and Florida to warrant Florida
to its exercise of power over him... .275
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident
defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. The
application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's
activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.... The settlor's execution in Florida of her power of appointment cannot remedy the absence of such an
276
act in this case.
For Black and his group, on the other hand, the primary test was not the
sufficiency of contacts between the nonresident defendant and the state of the
forum, but rather the sufficiency of the relationship of the subject of the litigation to the state of the forum, a sort of combination of the principles of choice
of law with those of forum non conveniens:
It seems to me that where a transaction has as much relationship to a State as
Mrs. Donner's appointment had to Florida its courts ought to have power to
adjudicate controversies arising out of that transaction, unless the litigation there
would impose such a heavy and disproportionate burden on a nonresident defendant
that it would offend what this Court has referred to as "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.". .. I can see nothing which approaches that degree
2 7r
of unfairness. Florida ... was a reasonably convenient forum for all.
...we are dealing with litigation arising from a transaction that had an abundance
of close and substantial connections with the State of Florida. z 8s
If the Warren test quoted above suggests a greater concern with the federal
nature of the nation, and if it is more restrictive of a state's judicial jurisdiction
than that urged by Black, it is nonetheless a workable and not unduly confining
expression of the limitations of the Due Process Clause. Before stating this
test, however, Warren engaged in an unfortunate attempt to distinguish the
-'357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958).
' Id., at 251.

-Id., at 253-54.
1n Id, at 258-59.

-Id., at 260.
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McGee case.
The distinctions he urged were hardly persuasive
and the
language he used was most unfortunate, for it was a return to the "exceptional"
activities notions of Doherty & Co. v. Goodman28' and Hess v.Pawloski,28 2
both of which he cited as authority for his position. 28 3 As Mr. Chief Justice
Warren once wrote: "In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock
back.. ..,,284 In this very case he acknowledged the existence of the change
which had taken place in the evolution from "the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff
28 5
...to the flexible standards of InternationalShoe."
It is possible but not
necessary to read the Court's opinion in this case as a return to the standards
which Professor Scott condemned forty years ago. It is more likely that it will
be read, even by the Court, as a stopping place-whether permanent or temporary-on what had been the road toward nationwide in personam jurisdiction
for state courts.
After disposing of the Florida case in this manner, the Delaware case was
easy of resolution. "Delaware is under no obligation to give full faith and credit
to a Florida judgment invalid in Florida because offensive to the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 28 6 Thus the Court disposed of the only
federal question presented by the Delaware certiorari. But the result is one
which does not yet put this family battle to a final rest. For if Florida, on the
remand of the case, decides that the trustees were not indispensable parties, it
could enter judgment against the resident defendants in favor of Mrs. Denckla
and Mrs. Stewart. The Supreme Court of the United States did not hold, for
it was not properly called upon to hold, that the Delaware decree is entitled to
full faith and credit in Florida. Moreover, Mrs. Denckla, and perhaps Mrs.
Stewart, 28 7 were not parties to the Delaware litigation and were not subject to
the in personam jurisdiction of the Delaware courts, according to the decision
in the Denckia case. Thus, unless the Delaware decree is to be held binding on
- Id., at 251-52.

The one factual distinction which stands up is the fact that in the Denckla case the
defendant did "no solicitation of business in that State either in person or by mail.' Ibid.
But the cause of action in Dencila arose "out of an act done or transaction consummated
in the forum State," ibid., to the same degree as in McGee, for the claim in Florida is based
on the will. The relationships of the trustee with Florida, by interchange of mail with Mrs.
Donner, were even more extensive than the contacts of the insurance company with California in McGee. The trustee "chose to maintain business relations with Mrs. Donner in that
State for eight years, regularly communicating with her with respect to the business of the
trust, including the very appointment in question:" Id., at 259. The fact that California had
enacted a special jurisdictional statute for nonresident defendants can hardly effect a difference inthe application of the Due Process Clause to the transaction in question. All that the
statute could do, so far as the federal issue is concerned, is to give notice to a future litigant
of his potential liability to the jurisdiction of the California courts. But in the McGee case,
the statute was retroactively applied with the approval of the full court. See also, Allen v.
Superior Court, 41 Cal.2d 306, 259 P.2d 905 (1953); Nelson v. Miller, 11 Il.2d 378, 143

N.E.2d 673 (1957).
=8294 U.S. 623, 627 (1935).
'

m274 U.S. 352 (1927).

-8

357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954).

2"357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).

- Id., at 255.

mSee note 237 supra.
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Florida on some thesis of in rem jurisdiction,'2-8 the result will be that in Delaware the children of Mrs. Hanson, who are domiciliaries of Florida, will be
entitled to the assets of the 1935 trust, but in Florida Mrs. Hanson will be under
the compulsion of the Florida courts to turn the assets of the 1935 trust over
to Mrs. Denckla and Mrs. Stewart, pursuant to the terms of the will. The
Supreme Court of the United States may well be called upon again to attempt
to unravel this Gordian knot resulting from the difference of opinions of the
Delaware and Florida courts.
VII. CONCLUSION

The cases from InternationalShoe to Denckla reveal that although old dogma
has been destroyed new doctrine to replace it has not been firmly fashioned. The
language of "reasonableness" and "fair play" to which the Court has resorted
is rather a statement of a conclusion than a reason. The nationalization of
American society has been reflected in the trend toward greater power of the
states over defendants who neither owe them "allegiance" nor are subject to
their physical power. But Denckla and Vanderbilt reveal that the concept of
territorial limitations on state power is still a vital one.28 9 The state courts

and the lower federal courts are thus left to decide the cases which come before
them by the traditional legal reasoning by analogy. 290 The Supreme Court opinions have revealed some if not all of the factors which are to be taken into
consideration in reaching a conclusion on the issue of in personam jurisdiction.
They do not reveal how each factor is to be weighed in combination with the
others. It may be that it is not possible to do so and that here as elsewhere in
our constitutional law the Supreme Court must depend on the good faith and
good judgment of the other courts in the American judicial system. The fact
is that, thus far at least, no one outside of the Court has been able to do better.
The want of a "synthesis" of the decisions under the Due Process Clause 291
has not been provided except by those who would read their personal predilections into the Constitution. 29 - Thus, in this area as in others, the emphasis must
continue to be, as Dean Levi has told us, "on the process" by which the result
is to be reached:
Legal reasoning has a logic of its own. Its structure fits it to- give meaning to
ambiguity and to test constantly whether the society has come to see new differences
I "Properly speaking such assets are intangibles that have no 'physical' location. But
their embodiment in documents treated for most purposes as the assets themselves makes
them partake of the nature of tangibles. Cf. Wheeler v. Sohrner,233 U.S. 434, 439." 357 U.S.
235, 247 n. 16 (1958).
Cf. Davies v. British Geon, Ltd., [19571 1 Q.B. I.
See Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (1949).
See Swisher, The Supreme Court in Modern Role (1958).
" See, e.g., Pritchett, The Political Offender and the Warren Court (1958).
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or similarities. Social theo-ies and other changes in society will be relevant when the
ambiguity has to be resolved for a particular case. Nor can it be said that the result
of such a method is too uncertain to compel. The compulsion of the law is clear;
the explanation is that the area of doubt is constantly set forth. The probable area
of expansion or contraction is foreshadowed as the system works. This is the only
kind of system which will work when people do not agree completely. The loyalty
of the community is directed toward the institution in which it participates. The
words change to receive the content which the community gives to them. The effort
to find complete agreement before the institution goes to work is meaningless. It is
to forget the very purpose for which the institution of legal reasoning has been
fashioned. This should be remembered as a world community suffers in the absence
of law.2 3
Levi, op. cit. supra note 290, at 73-74.
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